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Abstract
This paper studies sales techniques which discourage consumer search by making
it harder or more expensive to return to buy after a search for alternatives. It is
unilaterally protable for a seller to deter search under mild conditions, but sellers
can su¤er when all do so. When a seller cannot commit to its policy, it exploits the
inference that those consumers who try to buy later have no good alternative, and in
many cases the outcome is as if the seller could only make an exploding o¤er. Search
deterrence results in sub-optimal matching of products to consumers and often raises
the price consumers pay.
Keywords: Consumer search, price discrimination, sequential screening, exploding
o¤ers, sales techniques.
1 Introduction
When feasible, a seller often makes it cheaper to purchase its product at the rst op-
portunity, and if a potential customer wishes to return to buy later the price is higher
or purchase might even be impossible. The motive for this form of price discrimination
might be strategic, and as a kind of high-pressure sales tactic the seller o¤ers a buy-now
discount or makes an exploding o¤er when it rst meets the buyer to increase its chance
of making the sale. Alternatively, the seller might opportunistically raise its price when
a buyer tries to purchase later, if it infers that the buyer has discovered in the meantime
This paper replaces our earlier working paper, Armstrong and Zhou (2011). We are grateful for helpful
comments to Marco Haan, Hao Li, Marc Möller, Alessandro Pavan, Andrew Rhodes, Maher Said, Roland
Strausz, John Vickers, Glen Weyl, and Asher Wolinsky.
1
that her other options are poor. Regardless of the sellers motive, a buyer who anticipates
the price will rise if she investigates other options is more inclined to buy immediately, and
search is deterred.
Because inducements for quick decisions are usually o¤ered casually during the course
of a one-to-one sales encounter, and because opportunist price hikes are not publicly an-
nounced, it is hard to obtain empirical evidence about this form of price discrimination.
In his account of sales practices, Cialdini (2001, page 208) provides examples of exploding
o¤ers: A door-to-door magazine solicitor might say that salespeople are in the customers
area for just a day; after that, they, and the customers chance to buy their magazine
package, will be long gone. A home vacuum cleaner operation I inltrated instructed its
sales trainees to claim that, I have so many other people to see that I have the time to visit
a family only once. Its company policy that even if you decide later that you want this
machine, I cant come back and sell it to you.In a labor market context, Roth and Xing
(1994, page 1001) discuss exploding job o¤ers. For instance, judges make o¤ers for clerk-
ships which are withdrawn if not accepted quickly, perhaps during the telephone call itself.
Law journals operate a system whereby an author can submit an article simultaneously to
several journals, and a journal o¤ers to publish provided the author agrees quickly before
she has heard back from other, perhaps more prestigious, journals.1
A less extreme tactic is to allow a buyer to purchase later but to make it more expensive
to do so, so that a buy-now discount is o¤ered. Bone (2006, pages 7173) describes
how a home improvement company he inltrated o¤ers its potential customers a buy-now
discount if the customer signs the contract immediately. Robinson (1995) discusses other
examples of these discounts, such as a prospective tenant who is o¤ered an apartment for
$900 per month but to whom the landlord o¤ers $850 if she agrees immediately, or a car
dealer trying to close a deal who o¤ers a further $500 o¤ the price if the buyer accepts
now, so (as he claims) he can make his sales quota for that month. A recent UK review
1The submission page of the Harvard Law Review currently has a link to a letter from a number of
prominent law journals committing them to give an author seven days to decide whether to accept an
o¤er to publish. The letter states In recent years, many law journals have adopted the practice of is-
suing exploding o¤ers giving scholars only a couple of days, hours or even minutes to accept an o¤er
of publication. The reasoning behind these o¤ers was simple: we each hoped to secure the best articles
for our own journal before others could identify them and make competing o¤ers. See harvardlawre-
view.org/submissions [visited 26 September 2014].
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of cosmetic surgery was concerned about reports of patients being o¤ered discounts for
surgery if they sign a binding contract at the end of the rst consultation.2
Airlines provide a rich source for examples of dynamic pricing. Most relevant to this
paper are allegations that airfares can rise if a traveller leaves a travel website and then
returns, while the price returns to its original level if the computers cookiesare deleted
or a di¤erent computer is used.3
To implement these strategies a seller needs to be able to recognize customers, in the
sense that it can distinguish potential customers it meets for the rst time from those
who have returned. Usually this is simply not possible. (A supermarket, for instance,
keeps no track of a consumers exit from the store.) Nevertheless, in many markets
notably those which depend on personal interaction between buyers and sellers customer
recognition is feasible. A sales assistant might discern from a potential customers questions
or demeanor whether this is her rst visit to the store for the relevant product. A telephone
or doorstep seller can be condent when the rst encounter with a prospective customer
occurs. Sometimes as with job o¤ers, automobile sales, housing rentals, tailored consumer
nancial products, medical or life insurance, cosmetic surgery, academic journals, or home
improvements a consumer needs to interact with a seller to discuss specic requirements,
and this process reveals the consumers identity. In online markets, a retailer may be able
to tell if a visitor using the same computer has visited its website before.
After discussing related literature, in section 3 we present a simple example which
illustrates a sellers incentive to deter search. Here, a seller attempts to sell its product to
a buyer whose utility from the product is common knowledge. The buyer will subsequently
be able to nd an alternative for the product, although how good that alternative is is not
known when the buyer rst meets the seller. If the seller allows free recall so that its
price is unchanged after the buyer searches for the alternative the buyer will search and
return to buy whenever the payo¤ from that alternative is disappointing. The seller can
2See paragraph 5.8 of Review of the Regulation of Cosmetic Interventions (Final Report), Department
of Health (UK), April 2013. A similar observation was made in a recent investigation by the UK consumer
right body, Which?, into the selling of laser eye surgery. See www.which.co.uk/news/2014/08/undercover-
we-expose-laser-eye-surgery-clinics-376378 [visited 2 October 2014].
3For instance, type deleting cookies ightsinto a search engine to see various allegations (and denials)
in the media. Of course, even if airlines never actual engage in this practice, the fact that many travellers
believe they do will nevertheless act to deter search.
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increase its prots, however, if it commits to an exploding o¤er, while the buyer is harmed
by this tactic. If the seller cannot commit to its buy-later policy, it nevertheless has an
incentive to induce the buyer to purchase immediately with a low buy-nowprice.
In section 4, we study a richer model in which search is costly and the buyer has private
information about her utility from the sellers product. In section 4.1 we show it is more
protable to o¤er a buy-now discount than allow free recall when the relevant demand
curve is log-concave. This form of price discrimination has novel features: both buy-now
and buy-later prices can rise relative to the uniform price with free recall, and the seller
charges a lower price to buyers who value its product more. If the seller is constrained to
make an exploding o¤er or to allow free recall, an exploding o¤er is more protable in the
more restrictive case where demand is concave.
Buy-now discounts and exploding o¤ers are simple tactics, which are easy to communi-
cate and rationalize to buyers.4 Moreover, these tactics are informal, in the sense they do
not require a potential buyer to sign a contract for the right to buy later. (For instance,
while one can envisage a sales assistant o¤ering a discount on a camera before I end my
shift, it is harder to imagine the assistant o¤ering a non-refundable deposit contract for
the right to buy later.) Nevertheless, the seller may do better still by using more ornate
selling schemes. In section 4.2 we derive the optimal way to sell in this environment, which
allows the buyer to buy immediately at a low price, to return later to buy at a high price,
and it also o¤ers a menu of option contracts (where by paying a non-refundable deposit the
buyer obtains the right to buy later at a specied price). The optimal mechanism involves
search deterrence, in the sense that more buyers purchase without discovering their outside
option than would be the case with free recall. In a numerical example, this scheme does
only modestly better than the buy-now discount scheme.
In section 4.3 we discuss the sellers policy when it cannot commit to its buy-later
price. A customer who returns to buy later reveals she has found no attractive alternative,
and the seller often has an incentive to raise its price to this customer. When there is
4It may be important for the seller to be able to rationalize its sales policy, to give the policy more
credibility. For example Bone (page 71) writes that to justify the buy-now discount customers were told
the company had so many appointments that it was di¢ cult for our salespeople to cover them all ...
if we went back to everyone twice we wouldnt see nearly as many people and would generate a lot less
business.
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an intrinsic cost of returning to the seller after search, the equilibrium involves no buyers
returning to the seller after search, and the outcome is as if the seller could only make an
exploding o¤er.
We extend our analysis to duopoly in section 5, where one sellers o¤er constitutes the
other sellers outside option. In section 5.1, the sellers supply di¤erentiated products, and
a buyer searches both for a low price and a good product. Here, each seller has an incentive
to deter search, but when both do this industry prot can fall relative to the free-recall
regime. Search deterrence not only leads to a less e¢ cient match between buyers and
products, but can also induce sellers to set even their discounted buy-now price above the
free-recall benchmark. Market performance with these sales techniques is poor: sellers are
usually worse o¤ relative to free recall, and buyers obtain a less suitable product in return
for a higher price. In section 5.2, sellers compete to supply a homogeneous product and
buyers search only for a low price. When sellers allow free recall the equilibrium involves
price dispersion. However, free recall is not an equilibrium when sellers can recognize
buyers who return after the rst encounter, while an equilibrium exists in which sellers
make exploding o¤ers at the monopoly price. Here, the ability of sellers to discriminate
against buyers who do not purchase at the rst opportunity boosts industry prot to the
collusive level and denies consumers the benets of competition.
The paper concludes by discussing fruitful directions for further research as well as
some thoughts about consumer policy to combat search deterrence.
2 Related Literature
This paper studies a new form of price discrimination, where price is conditioned on whether
the buyer has searched or not, and we nd that the ability to discriminate often leads
both prices to rise relative to the uniform-price benchmark. In the context respectively of
monopoly and duopoly, Nahata, Ostaszewski, and Sahoo (1990) and Corts (1998) study
when this phenomenon can happen. Both papers study third-degree discrimination, where
there are no cross-price e¤ects in demand for the two products. The former paper requires
prot functions not to be single-peaked, while the latter needs sellers to have di¤erent
views about which is the strongmarket (i.e., the market with the higher price when
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price discrimination is used), to obtain this outcome. In our framework, cross-price e¤ects
are present, and both buy-now and buy-later prices rise due to the articial search frictions
introduced with price discrimination.
The basic mechanism in our model, that a higher cost of returning to buy later makes
agents less inclined to search, has been studied before. For instance, Karni and Schwartz
(1977) and Janssen and Parakhonyak (2014) show that an agent will cease her search sooner
than she would with free recall if the ability to return to a previous option is uncertain
or costly. The uncertainty or cost of return is exogenous in these papers, rather than
determined endogenously by a sellers sales tactics as in our paper.
Few previous papers relate directly to strategic search deterrence. One that does is
Ellison and Wolitzky (2012), who o¤er a model with homogeneous products and price
dispersion in which a seller deters search by making onward search more costly, rather
than by making it more expensive to buy later. They suppose that a buyers incremental
search cost increases with her cumulative search e¤ort, and if a seller increases its in-
store search cost for instance, by instructing its sales sta¤ to engage buyers in lengthy
discussions or complicating its price scheme this will make further search less attractive.
As with our models in section 5, even if intrinsic frictions are small a market can still su¤er
from substantial endogenous search frictions and high prices in equilibrium.
Our analysis of search deterrence without commitment relates to two classic papers.
Diamond (1971) shows how even small search frictions can lead to monopoly pricing in
a market where sellers supply a homogenous product. In its starkest form, hold-up can
cause the market to shut down altogether, and a closely related argument drives one main
result in section 4.3. In the literature on durable good pricing initiated by Coase (1972),
when a buyer does not buy quickly, she reveals she has a low valuation for the product.
Because of this adverse selection, the seller has an opportunistic incentive to reduce its
price to buyers who buy later. In our model, by contrast, if a buyer tries to buy later,
she reveals she has searched but found her outside option was disappointing. Due to this
advantageous selection, our seller often sets a higher price to buyers who buy later.5
5Zhu (2012) examines equilibrium pricing in a market for over-the-counter nancial securities. His
model has a single seller who searches sequentially for a high price o¤er among a number of potential
buyers. A buyers price is valid only for the initial contact, and if the seller rejects the initial o¤er and
contacts that buyer a second time, the buyer suggests a new price. Zhu shows that a buyer lowers the
6
This paper is part of a wider literature which studies how sellers determine the infor-
mation their potential buyers possess at the time they decide whether to purchase. Most
of this literature studies a situation in which buyers learn, or do not learn, their idio-
syncratic value for the product, while our model concerns the extent to which buyers are
informed about the various o¤ers available to them in the market. Lewis and Sappington
(1994) discuss a situation where the seller can control how much the buyer learns about
her valuation before purchase. One strategy allows the buyer to discover her valuation
before agreeing to buy, in which case she purchases when the valuation is above the price.
A second strategy, akin to an exploding o¤er in our framework, forces the buyer to buy
without knowing her valuation. Lewis and Sappington show that the seller either reveals
all or none of the information, and the second strategy is more protable than the rst
when the production cost is small.6 Essentially the same insight underlies the observation
that an exploding o¤er boosts prot in our simple model in section 3.
Sellers can a¤ect how informed their buyers are by inuencing how early they buy, since
a buyer plausibly has less precise information about her eventual value when she buys in
advance of consumption. There is now a large literature on advance selling, mostly
within marketing, much of which concerns yield management. In a paper more focussed
on price discrimination motives for advance selling, Nocke, Peitz, and Rosar (2011) analyze
a sellers incentive to o¤er an advance-purchase discount. Nocke et al. assume the seller
can commit to its price path, and nd conditions under which an advance-purchase discount
is more protable than either making all buyers buy in advance (akin to an exploding o¤er)
or allowing all buyers to buy at the time of consumption (akin to free recall). In their model,
which involves a binary valuation structure, the seller can do no better with more ornate
schemes than to o¤er an advance-purchase discount.
With a richer information structure, though, the seller will be able to squeeze more
prot out of buyers by using more complicated selling mechanisms. Such mechanisms o¤er
the buyer a menu of option contracts, which involve paying a deposit for the right to buy
o¤ered price if the seller makes a second approach, since the buyer infers the seller did not nd an attractive
price quote from other buyers.
6Wang (2014) extends this model so that buyers can discover their true valuation by incurring a cost.
He nds that the seller might wish partially to reveal product information, so as to deter buyers from
discovering their exact valuation.
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later at a specied price (or equivalently, specifying a partial refund if the buyer eventually
does not want the product). An early contribution to this literature on optimal sequential
screening is Courty and Li (2000), who characterize the most protable menu of refund
contracts. Our study of the optimal way to sell in section 4.2 with a single seller uses the
techniques developed in this sequential screening literature.
In formal terms, an information structure in which a buyer initially has an imprecise
estimate of her eventual value for the product, which is made precise at the time of con-
sumption, is similar to a situation in which a buyer initially sees a product of known value
from the seller and can then discover an uncertain alternative elsewhere. However, in our
model the buyer only discovers her net valuation if she decides to search, while in the
sequential screening literature the buyers information usually evolves exogenously over
time.7 Relative to the sequential screening literature, our focus is more on casual sales
encounters, and for this reason we study ad hoc but simple sales techniques as well as
the optimal way to sell. Our analysis reveals the importance of the shape of the relevant
demand curve and the possibility that all prices rise relative to the uniform pricing case,
neither of which were apparent in earlier contributions. We also analyze additional set-
tings, such as when the seller does not have commitment power or when the outside option
is provided by a second strategic seller.
Indeed, in an oligopoly context it makes a major di¤erence whether uncertainty concerns
a buyers valuation for the product, common to all sellers, or the o¤er made by a rival.
An extension from monopoly to oligopoly can be straightforward in the former case, and
indeed competition might then eliminate a sellers incentive to make early o¤ers.8 When
7In this respect our analysis is closer to Krahmer and Strausz (2011). They consider a procurement
setting where the agent can choose to invest costly e¤ort to discover the actual cost of implementing a
project after signing the contract. As in our paper, they nd that the optimal mechanism features a xed
price and a menu of option contracts, and it not only aims to screen agents with di¤erent ex ante private
information but also takes into account the incentive for agents to acquire information.
8For instance, consider the model in Armstrong and Vickers (2001, section 4). Two symmetric sellers
supply a horizontally di¤erentiated product, and buyers are heterogenous both in terms of their brand
preference, x, and their taste for the product, . Armstrong and Vickers assume buyers know  when they
choose their seller, and show that an equilibrium exists in which each seller o¤ers a cost-based two-part
tari¤, provided that the market is covered and x is uncorrelated with . However, the same argument
applies even if sellers have the opportunity to make early o¤ers, before buyers know the realization of their
. So long as a buyers prior distribution for  is uncorrelated with x, when its rival o¤ers the cost-based
two-part tari¤ (available early or late), a sellers best response is to do the same. Thus, in this framework
sellers have no incentive to make early o¤ers.
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the buyers uncertainty concerns the o¤er she might receive from a rival, though, a seller
has an incentive to induce early purchase, and this introduces endogenous search frictions
into the market. These frictions enable sellers to raise their prices and, where relevant,
cause sub-optimal matching of product to consumer.9
3 An Illustrative Example
A seller costlessly supplies a product to a risk-neutral buyer. The buyer is known to value a
unit of this product at u > 0, and if she pays price p for the product her net surplus is u p.
The buyer has an alternative source for the product which gives her exogenous net surplus
v. This net surplus is a continuous random variable with cumulative distribution function
(CDF) G(v) and support [0; vmax], and this distribution is commonly known by both seller
and buyer. (Uncertainty in v might stem from uncertainty about the match utility of the
alternative product or its price.) In this example we assume that 0 < vmax  u.10 The
buyer does not know the realization of v when she rst encounters the seller, and needs
to leave the seller to discover v. However, the buyer incurs no intrinsic search cost to nd
out v, nor to return to the seller after search. The seller never observes the realization of
v, and so cannot make its o¤er to the buyer contingent on her outside option. The key
assumption we make throughout this paper is that the seller can distinguish whether it is
meeting the buyer for the rst time or after a previous encounter.
In most markets, a sellers price does not depend (at least in the short term) on when the
buyer decides to purchase, and the buyer has free recallof the sellers o¤er. To analyze
this uniform price benchmark, suppose the seller o¤ers price p to the buyer, regardless
9Möller and Watanabe (2014) develop a duopoly model of advance-purchase discounts which is related
to our discussion of competitive buy-now discounts in section 5.1. In their model, a buyer knows by how
much she prefers one product to the other but initially she is uncertain about which product will be the
better one. An advance-purchase discount is attractive to buyers who do not care much about getting the
better product, while choosierbuyers prefer to wait and pay more for the product they prefer. Relative
to a monopoly scenario where one rm sells both products, they show that competition leads to a deeper
advance-purchase discount and a worse match between product and consumer.
10If the buyer consumes the sellers product and the outside option, suppose her gross utility ismaxfu; vg,
in which case our assumption vmax  u implies that the buyer never gains additional utility from consuming
the outside option alongside the sellers product. One situation where vmax  u is if the buyers two options
involve the same homogeneous product (as we study in section 5.2), so that v = u   P where P is the
alternative price.
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of when the buyer decides to purchase. With free recall, the buyer will investigate the
outside option, and return to buy from the seller when u   p  v. Therefore, the sellers
expected prot with free-recall price p is pG(u  p), and let pF denote the most protable
free-recall price. The expected net surplus of the buyer when free recall is allowed is
Ev[maxfu  pF ; vg], where Ev[] denotes taking expectations with respect to v.
However, the seller can do better than this by committing to an exploding o¤er, where
the buyer must decide whether to purchase before she can discover the outside option. (If
she chooses to search, the seller will refuse to sell the product if she returns later.) The
buyer accepts the exploding o¤er with price p if u   p  v = Ev[v], and by choosing the
price which just makes this inequality bind the seller can obtain prot u  v. To see that
the sellers prot is greater with an exploding o¤er, observe that u  v satises
u  v > u  Ev[maxfu  pF ; vg] = Ev[minfpF ; u  vg]  pFG(u  pF ) : (1)
Here, the rst inequality holds because maxfu  pF ; vg  v, with strict inequality when v
is small, while the second follows from the assumption that v  u for sure.11 When u = 1
and v is uniformly distributed on the interval [0; 1], for instance, the sellers prot doubles
when it makes an exploding o¤er. (In this case, pF = u  v = 12 , i.e., the sellers price is the
same in the two regimes, but the buyer always purchases the product with an exploding
o¤er while she only buys half the time with free recall.)
The prot u  v from the exploding o¤er is the prot the seller could obtain if it could
observe v before setting its own price (in which case it would set price p = u  v), and this
represents the maximum prot the seller can extract using any mechanism. The reason why
an exploding o¤er boosts prot and harms the buyer is the same as the more familiar insight
that a seller would like to sell to a buyer before the latter learns her uncertain valuation for
the item (provided the valuation is sure to be above the sellers cost), and this is because the
seller then captures the entire consumer surplus rather than merely a rectangleunder
her demand curve. With an exploding o¤er, the buyer obtains expected net surplus v,
which is strictly below her surplus in the free-recall regime, Ev[maxfu  pF ; vg].
Finally, suppose the seller cannot commit to its buy-later price when it rst meets the
buyer. That is, the seller makes an initial o¤er which is good for that time only, and it
11Since u  vmax, it follows that Ev[minfpF ; u  vg]  pF  PrfpF  u  vg = pFG(u  pF ).
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cannot make a credible commitment to its price should the buyer return later. Consider
the subgame in which the buyer rejects the initial o¤er made by the seller (whatever that
may be) and chooses to discover v. Since it is costless for the buyer to return to the seller,
we suppose she does so regardless of v to see what buy-later price the seller o¤ers, and will
accept the sellers buy-later price p2 if u p2  v. Therefore, the subgame-perfect buy-later
price is just the free-recall price, pF , which maximizes p2G(u   p2). If she searches, then,
the rational buyer anticipates she will obtain expected surplus Ev[maxfu  pF ; vg], and so
is just willing to pay a buy-nowprice p1 which satises u   p1 = Ev[maxfu   pF ; vg]
and to purchase without search. Naturally, this buy-now price is below pF , since the buyer
needs to be rewarded if she is to forego the option value of the alternative. This strategy
yields the seller the prot u   Ev[maxfu   pF ; vg], which from (1) is weakly above the
prot generated when it induces the buyer to search, pFG(u  pF ). (The prot is strictly
higher whenever the buyer sometimes consumes the outside option with free recall, i.e.,
if u   pF < vmax. This is the case if vmax is close enough to u or if the density for v at
vmax is small.) Hence, even if the seller cannot commit to its sales policy, it usually has an
incentive to deter search.12 In the example where u = 1 and v is uniformly distributed on
[0; 1], the buy-now price which just deters search is p1 = 38 , and the sellers price rises to
pF =
1
2
if the buyer rejects the initial o¤er. Here, the sellers prot rises by 50% if it deters
search, instead of doubling when it could commit to an exploding o¤er.
The intuition for why search deterrence is protable even without commitment is as
follows. The joint surplus available to the seller and buyer with a given selling mechanism
is a weighted sum of u (when the buyer purchases from the seller) and the average value
of v conditional on the buyer taking the outside option. Since v  u, this joint surplus
is maximized when the buyer always purchases from the seller. When the seller cannot
commit to its buy-later policy, it is constrained to deliver the same surplus to the buyer
as it does with free recall, but can keep the additional joint surplus resulting from search
deterrence. When the seller can commit, though, it can enjoy this extra joint surplus but
12There is a stark contrast between this model and the similar model in section I of Aghion and Bolton
(1986) where the seller has no incentive to induce the buyer to purchase early. This di¤erence stems from
our assumption that the seller does not observe v if the buyer searches. (If the seller can observe v when
the buyer searches, as discussed previously it would set its buy-later price equal to u v and make expected
prot u  v, and it can do no better than this with another selling mechanism.)
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also reduce the buyers surplus by making search less attractive.
In the next section we extend this framework so that the buyer has private information
about her value for the sellers product, u, which is sometimes below the value of the
outside option, v, and it is costly for the buyer to discover the outside option.
4 A Monopoly Model
A seller o¤ers a product with constant marginal cost which is normalized to zero. The
product yields random utility u  0 to a risk-neutral buyer. This utility u is observed by
the buyer when she rst meets the seller and is unchanged over time, but in contrast to the
previous section u is not observed by the seller. The distribution of u has support [0; umax],
and has CDF F () and density function f() which is continuous on its support. There is
an outside option which yields uncertain net surplus v  0 to the buyer. For simplicity,
v is assumed to be distributed independently of u.13 The distribution of v has support
[0; vmax], and has CDF G() and a continuous density function g(v) on (0; vmax]. (We allow
for an atomat v = 0, reecting the possibility that the buyer does not nd an outside
option.) The buyer does not know the realization of v when she rst encounters the seller,
and must incur a search cost s  0 and leave the seller to reach the outside option and
discover its value. The seller never observes the realization of v. For simplicity, we assume
for now that the buyer incurs no further search cost if she comes back and buys from the
seller after investigating the outside option.14
If the buyer consumes neither the sellers product nor the outside option, her payo¤ is
zero. However, this is irrelevant if the search cost satises
s < v ; (2)
where v is the expected value of the outside option v. Condition (2), which we assume
henceforth, ensures that the buyer prefers investigating the outside option to buying noth-
13This implies that buyer and seller have the same information about v when they rst meet. Correlation
between u and v might induce a non-monotonic stopping rule for the buyer which complicates the analysis.
14In most cases, buyers do face an intrinsic cost of returning to a previously visited seller. In most of our
analysis, introducing a small intrinsic returning cost does not a¤ect results qualitatively, but complicates
the analysis, and we assume it away. However, when we discuss the situation without commitment in
section 4.3, whether or not there is an intrinsic return cost will make an important di¤erence.
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ing. The buyer gains no extra utility if she consumes both the product and the outside
option, and her gross utility with both items is equal to maxfu; vg.
Let Q(p)  1   F (p) denote the demand curve faced by the seller in the hypothetical
case when the outside option v is zero. We assume
logQ(p) is strictly concave when Q(p) > 0 : (3)
When the buyer has a deterministic outside option v, this condition ensures that the sellers
demand at price p, Q(p+ v), is more elastic when v is larger.15
4.1 Simple ways to sell
In this section we analyze three simple ways the seller in this environment can supply its
product.
Free recall: We rst analyze the uniform price benchmark where a sellers price does not
depend on when the buyer decides to purchase.
Suppose the seller o¤ers price p to the buyer. If the buyer obtains utility u from the
sellers product, her net surplus if she buys immediately is u   p, while her expected net
surplus if she investigates the outside option is Ev[maxfv; u   pg]   s. If she investigates
the outside option she incurs the search cost but can then consume the superior option.
Let
S(x)  Ev[maxfx; vg]  x =
Z vmax
x
(1 G(v))dv (4)
denote the expected benet of search when the buyer has free recall of payo¤ x at the
seller. Here, S() is decreasing and convex. With free recall the buyer will purchase the
sellers product without search whenever u p  Ev[maxfu p; vg] s, i.e., if S(u p)  s
or u  p+ a, where a solves
S(a) = s :
(From (2), such an a exists, and it is unique, strictly positive and decreases with s.) The
parameter a, which depends only on the distribution of the outside option and the cost of
15Condition (3) rules out the boundary case with a loglinear demand curve (i.e., the case where u is
exponentially distributed). In that case, none of the search deterring sales tactics discussed in this paper
can strictly improve the sellers prot relative to the free-recall benchmark.
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its discovery, represents the net surplus the buyer needs to obtain from the seller in order
to forgo search when there is free recall. For the remainder of the paper we impose the
following mild condition:
a  umax : (5)
Assumption (5) rules out the uninteresting case in which the buyer searches even if she has
the highest possible valuation umax and the seller charges the lowest possible price of zero.
(Since a  vmax, a su¢ cient condition for this to hold is that vmax  umax.)
If the buyer decides to investigate the outside option, i.e., if u  p+ a, she will return
to buy from the seller when the outside option turns out to be worse than the sellers o¤er,
i.e., when v < u  p. The buyers purchase decision for the various realizations of (u; v) is
summarized in Figure 1. Given this pattern of consumption, the rms total demand with
free recall and price p, denoted q(p), is
q(p) = Ev[Q(p+ minfv; ag)] : (6)
The most protable free-recall price, denoted pF , therefore maximizes pq(p).
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Figure 1: Demand with free recall
As shown on the gure, demand can be divided into buy-nowdemand, denoted q1(p),
and buy-laterdemand q2(p). Buy-now demand is the fraction of buyers who purchase
immediately without search, i.e., q1(p) = Q(p + a). Buy-later demand consists of those
buyers who purchase after investigating the outside outside option, i.e., q2(p) = q(p) q1(p).
Buy-later demand can increase with price: an increase in p shifts the region of buy-later
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demand uniformly to the right on Figure 1, and so q2 increases with p if the density of u
increases with u, i.e., if Q() is concave.
More generally, buy-now demand is more elastic than total demand (and buy-later
demand), which is the fundamental reason why the seller with commitment power wishes to
discriminate against buyers who wish to purchase after investigating their outside option.16
Lemma 1 With free recall, when there is some buy-now demand it is more elastic than
total demand.
Proof. From (6), we have
q0(p) = Ev[Q0(p+ minfv; ag)] > Ev

Q0(p+ a)
Q(p+ a)
Q(p+ minfv; ag)

=
q01(p)
q1(p)
q(p) ;
where the inequality follows from the strict log-concavity of Q in (3) and the fact that
minfv; ag  a with strict inequality when v < a. This proves the claim.
Intuitively, buy-now demand Q(p + a) can be regarded as the demand from a buyer
with known outside option a. From (6), total demand is an average of demands, each of
which has a weakly lower outside option minfv; ag. Condition (3) therefore implies that
buy-now demand is more elastic than total demand. A similar argument to that used in
Lemma 1 shows that total demand q(p) is more elastic than monopoly demand Q(p), which
implies that pF is lower than the monopoly price p which maximizes pQ(p).
Buy-now discounts: Next suppose that the seller engages in price discrimination, and of-
fers distinct prices p1 and p2  p1 if a buyer respectively purchases immediately or after
search.17 For now, we assume the seller announces and commits to its buy-later price p2
when it rst encounters the buyer. Figure 2 depicts the pattern of demand with buy-now
price p1 and buy-later price p2. If the buyers utility is u, she prefers to buy without search
16The fact that demand from buyers who buy at the rst opportunity is more elastic than buy-later
demand is also important in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009). That paper only studied free recall,
and considered the impact of one seller being encountered rst by all buyers. This seller sets a lower price
than its less prominent rivals, since more of its demand consists of (elastic) buy-now demand.
17In many cases it makes sense to rule out situations where p2 < p1. For instance, it seems plausible
that the seller cannot verify if the buyer has actually engaged in search rather than merely left the seller
and returned. In this case, if p2 < p1, the buyer would never buy at the higher price p1, and the outcome
is as if the seller allowed free recall at price p2. However, even if it was possible to charge a lower buy-later
price, the following analysis shows that the seller does not wish to do so.
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if u p1  Ev[maxfu p2; vg] s, i.e., if S(u p2)  s+p2 p1 or u  p2 +S 1(s+p2 p1).
If she does search, she will return to buy later if u  p2  v.18
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Figure 2: Demand with buy-now price p1 and buy-later price p2
Given Lemma 1 it is intuitive that the seller wishes to set a lower price to buyers who
purchase at the rst opportunity. The next result veries this intuition.
Proposition 1 O¤ering a buy-now discount is more protable than allowing free recall.
For a given buy-later price p2 = p, comparing Figures 1 and 2, and recalling that
S 1(s) = a, shows that the impact on total demand of introducing a buy-now discount  
0 (so that p1 = p ) is precisely as if the exogenous search cost increased from s to s+ in
the free-recall regime. Thus, the rm is able to boost its demand by increasing endogenous
search frictions, but at the revenue cost of o¤ering a buy-now discount to its buyers.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that the former positive e¤ect outweighs the latter negative
e¤ect, at least for a small buy-now discount. Since buyers who purchase immediately value
18In fact, the buyer has a third option, which is to buy the product immediately and search for the
outside option. Following such a strategy yields the type-u buyer expected surplus Ev[maxfu; vg]  p1  s,
since she pays the buy-now price p1 and the search cost, and then can consume the better of u and v. When
p1  p2, so that the buy-now discount is small, this strategy is dominated by the buy-later strategy
which yields surplus Ev[maxfu   p2; vg]   s, and so Proposition 1 is valid. In addition, this buy and
searchstrategy is never followed in optimal mechanism discussed in the next section. More generally, if
prices for the product are high (because of production costs, for instance, which are normalized to zero in
our analysis), or if the nature of the product is such that consuming the product and the outside option
together is unrealistic (e.g., it is rarely possible for someone to accept two distinct jobs simultaneously),
the buyer will never follow this buy-and-search strategy.
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the sellers product more highly than those who buy later, Proposition 1 implies that the
seller charges a lower price to those buyers with higher valuations, which is not the typical
situation with price discrimination.
Exploding o¤ers: In some situations, it may not be practical for the seller to o¤er a buy-
now discount, and its only alternative to allowing free recall is to make an exploding o¤er.
For instance, the only credible story a salesman can tell might be that he is in the area
for today only, or similar. Suppose, then, that the seller makes an exploding o¤er, i.e., it
forces the buyer to decide whether to buy its product before she is able to discover v.19 If
the sellers price is p and the buyer values the sellers product at u, then her net surplus
is u   p if she buys immediately without search, while her expected surplus if she rejects
the o¤er is v   s. Therefore, the buyer will buy the product if and only if u  p + v   s,
and the sellers demand with an exploding o¤er at price p is Q(p+ v  s). The next result
describes when an exploding o¤er is more, or less, protable than allowing free recall.
Proposition 2
(i) If Q() is convex, free recall is (weakly) more protable than making an exploding o¤er;
(ii) If Q() is concave whenever Q > 0 and there is some buy-now demand with free recall,
making an exploding o¤er is (weakly) more protable than free recall.
Proof. If Q() is convex, Jensens Inequality implies that q(p), the sellers demand with
free recall dened in (6), satises
q(p) = Ev[Q(p+ minfv; ag)]  Q(p+ Ev[minfv; ag]) = Q(P + v   s) ;
where the second equality above follows from the identity
Ev[minfv; ag] = Ev[v + a maxfa; vg] = v   S(a) = v   s :
Therefore, for any given price making an exploding o¤er reduces the sellers demand relative
to free recall, which proves part (i).
19Of course, an exploding o¤er is a special case of a buy-now discount tari¤, where the buy-later price
is high. Buy-later demand vanishes when the discount p2   p1 is large enough, and from Figure 2 this is
the case when s + p2   p1  S(0) = v. The outcome then is as if the seller makes an exploding o¤er at
price p1.
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For part (ii) the reverse argument can be made, provided we take care that demand is
always positive. (The function Q() cannot be concave for all p  0 since it is either zero
for large p if umax is nite, or it approaches zero asymptotically.) Specically, suppose that
at the free-recall price pF there is positive buy-now demand, i.e., Q(pF + a) > 0. Then
the demand Q(pF + minfv; ag) is positive for all v. Jensens Inequality then implies that
making an exploding o¤er at the free-recall price pF will boost the sellers demand and
prots provided Q() is concave whenever it is positive.
Intuitively, making an exploding o¤er induces more buyers with relatively high u to
purchase immediately, but prevents those buyers with moderate u from returning to pur-
chase after search. Which e¤ect is stronger depends on the relative proportions of high-
and low-valuation buyers. When the density of u is increasing (i.e., when Q is concave),
there are proportionally more high-valuation buyers in the population, and so an exploding
o¤er is more protable than free recall.
An example: To illustrate this analysis, consider an example where both u and v are
uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and the search cost is s = 1
18
. It follows that Q(p) = 1  p,
S 1(x) = 1  p2x (for 0  x  1
2
) and a = S 1(s) = 2
3
. Figure 1 implies that free-recall
total demand at price p is q(p) = 5
9
  p. The optimal free-recall price is therefore 5
18
,
which also equals total demand. Of this demand, a fraction 20% comes from buyers who
buy without search (so there is some buy-now demand) and the remaining 80% consists of
those who search and then return to buy. The sellers prot with free recall is ( 5
18
)2  0:077
while aggregate consumer surplus can be calculated to be about 0:511.
Suppose next that the seller o¤ers a buy-now discount, where p is its buy-now price and
p+  its buy-later price. With linear demand Q, one can check that  does not a¤ect the
sellers total demand, which is again equal to q = 5
9
  p.20 The sellers prot is therefore
p
 
5
9
  p+ (  buy-later demand) :
Buy-later demand is the area of the triangle in Figure 2, which is 1
2
(S 1(s+))2. Thus, the
sellers prot is additively separable in the buy-now price p and the buy-later premium  .
As such, the optimal buy-now price is again p = 5
18
, while the optimal buy-later premium
20In general, one can show that introducing a buy-later premium   0 weakly reduces total demand if
Q is convex and weakly increases total demand if Q is concave (and there is some buy-now demand).
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can be calculated to be   0:121, which is about 43% of the buy-now price. Note that
when the seller engages in this form of price discrimination, both its prices weakly increase,
which contrasts with the usual case in monopoly price discrimination where the optimal
uniform price typically lies between the discriminatory prices. Here, about 70% of the
sellers customers buy without search, and so this sales tactic signicantly deters search.
The sellers prot with a buy-now discount is about 13% higher than it would be with free
recall, while consumer surplus is 2% lower.
Finally, suppose the seller makes an exploding o¤er at price p. A type-u buyer will buy
if and only if u   p  v   s = 4
9
. Therefore, the sellers demand with an exploding o¤er
at price p is the same as with free recall (as implied by Proposition 2), and so the optimal
price with an exploding o¤er is also p = 5
18
and the seller makes the same prot using
the two sales techniques. By denition, all of the sellers customers buy without search.
Buyers are now about 6% worse o¤ relative to free recall.21
In this section we discussed two simple ways to deter search buy-now discounts and
exploding o¤ers and found conditions which ensure they generate higher prots than free
recall. These procedures are easy to communicate and rationalize to buyers, and so merit
analysis in their own right. However, while it has been demonstrated that the seller has
an incentive to depart from free recall, the ad hoc nature of these sales tactics makes it
hard to obtain attractive results about the most protable version of either tactic. For
instance, it is unclear beyond the uniform example whether the optimal buy-now discount
tari¤ induces more buyers to forego search than would be the case with free recall. In the
next section we derive the optimal selling mechanism. As well as being a useful benchmark
with which to compare prots in the ad hoc schemes, the description of the optimal way
to sell is more transparent in terms of the primitives of the model.
4.2 The optimal way to sell
This section studies the sellers optimal selling procedure. As will be seen, the most
protable mechanism incorporates a buy-now discount, in that a buyer has the option
21In this example with buy-now discounts or exploding o¤ers, one can check that the buy and search
option mentioned in footnote 18 is dominated either by buying without search or by consuming the outside
option for sure.
19
either to buy the product immediately at a relatively low price or return to buy later at a
relatively high price (in fact, at the monopoly price p which maximizes pQ(p)). However,
the mechanism also uses an additional instrument, which is that the buyer can choose an
option contract, where by paying a non-refundable deposit on her rst visit she obtains
the right to return to buy later at a specied exercise price. In this mechanism, a buyer
with high u will choose to buy without search, a buyer with low u will never purchase the
item, while a buyer with intermediate u will search but pay for an option to return later if
the outside option is unsatisfactory.
The form of the optimal selling scheme is presented in the following result, the proof
of which is in the appendix.
Proposition 3 Let
(u)  u  1  F (u)
f(u)
(7)
be the agents virtual utility(which is increasing under condition (3)), and let p satisfy
(p) = 0 and u^ satisfy (u^) = a. Then the optimal selling procedure satises:
(i) if u < p, the type-u buyer consumes the outside option for sure;
(ii) if p  u  u^, the type-u buyer pays the seller a non-refundable deposit
D(u) =
Z u
p
G((~u))(0(~u)  1)d~u ; (8)
investigates the outside option, and returns to buy the sellers product later if v < (u) at
the incremental price
p(u) = u  (u) = 1  F (u)
f(u)
; (9)
(iii) if u > u^, the type-u buyer purchases the sellers product without search at price
P = D(u^) + p(u^) : (10)
Note that when u = p, the associated contract has D(u) = 0 and p(u) = p, so a buyer
always has the option to return to buy at the monopoly price without paying a deposit.
More generally, in the range [p; u^] the buy-later price p(u) decreases with u, while the
corresponding deposit D(u) increases with u. (This is because a buyer with a higher u
anticipates she is more likely to buy later, and hence she has more at stake in securing a low
20
buy-later price.) The pattern of demand in this optimal selling mechanism is illustrated in
Figure 3.
-
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Figure 3: Demand in the optimal mechanism
Intuition for the form of the optimal mechanism, and for the direction in which con-
sumption is distorted relative to the rst-best benchmark, goes as follows. Suppose, as in
section 3, the seller can observe a buyers valuation, u. It is intuitive (and can be shown
formally) that the most protable way to sell to the type-u buyer is either: (i) to prevent
the buyer from searching, or (ii) to allow the buyer to search but charge her for the option
to buy later at the e¢ cient price of zero. The maximum prot the seller can obtain with (i)
involves making an exploding o¤er such that the buyer is just indi¤erent between accepting
and going on to search (which yields the buyer surplus v   s), and this generates prot
s+ u  v :
With strategy (ii), the largest deposit D the seller can charge the type-u buyer for the right
to return to buy later for free satises Ev[maxfu; vg] D = v, and the resulting prot is
Ev[maxfu; vg]  v = S(u) + u  v :
We deduce that the no-search strategy (i) is more protable if and only if s  S(u), i.e., if
u  a. Otherwise, the buyer is instructed to search, she returns to buy when v < u, and
hence purchases with probability G(u).
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When u is the buyers private information, however, the seller wishes to reduce the
buyers information rent. It does so by choosing a probability of purchase which is weakly
below this rst-best level, except for the highest valuation buyer. Given assumption (5),
therefore, the type-umax buyer purchases without search in the optimal second-best mech-
anism, as do all buyers with u  u^, although the downward distortion implies that fewer
buyers purchase without search than in the rst-best procedure (that is, u^ > a). Those
who search either buy with probability zero (if u < p) or with probability G((u)) (if they
retain the right to buy later), and in either case this is below the corresponding rst-best
probability.
Proposition 3 also implies the following results:
Corollary 1 In the optimal selling mechanism: (i) it is cheaper for the buyer to buy
immediately than to buy after search (i.e., P  D(u) + p(u)), and (ii) more buyers buy
without search than would be the case with free recall.
Proof. Part (i) follows from the facts that P = D(u^) + p(u^) and D(u) + p(u) decreases
with u in the range p  u  u^. (To see the latter, note that the derivative of D(u) + p(u)
equals (0(u)  1)(G((u))  1), which is negative since (3) implies 0 > 1.) Now we prove
part (ii). If there is no buy-now demand with free recall, it is trivially the case that there
must be more buy-now demand in the optimal mechanism. Therefore, suppose there is
positive buy-now demand with free recall. We know that in the free-recall regime the
buyer buys immediately when u  a + pF , where pF is the optimal free-recall price. In
the optimal selling scheme, the buyer buys immediately when u  u^ = a + p^, where p^
maximizes pQ(p+ a). (The price p^ that maximizes pQ(p+ a) satises (a+ p^) = a, and so
u^ = a+ p^.) However, since Q(p+a) is buy-now demand in the free-recall regime with price
p, and since Lemma 1 shows that buy-now demand is more elastic than total demand in
the free-recall regime, it follows that pF > p^ , and so a+ pF > a+ p^, i.e., the seller deters
search in the optimal mechanism.
Returning to the linear demand example where u and v are uniformly distributed on
[0; 1] and s = 1
18
, we have (u) = 2u   1 and so the buy-now threshold in the optimal
mechanism is u^ = 5
6
, while a buyer will never purchase the sellers product if u < p = 1
2
.
As with all the earlier ad hoc schemes, total demand is 5
18
. Of those who eventually buy
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the product, exactly 60% do so without search. Expression (10) implies that the buy-now
price is again P = 5
18
, while the sellers prot from the optimal mechanism is about 0.09.
This is 16% greater than the prot with free recall, but only 3% more than the prot
generated with the simple buy-now discount scheme. Aggregate consumer surplus here is
about 4% below that obtained with free recall. Although total output is identical in all
four regimes that is, with free recall, buy-now discounts, exploding o¤ers, and the optimal
mechanism the pattern of consumption in (u; v)-space is di¤erent in each case. Since the
buy-now price is the same in all regimes, in this example buyers are best o¤with free recall
(as that regime has an unrestricted buy-later policy) and worst o¤ with an exploding o¤er
(which entirely removes their ability to buy later).
4.3 Search deterrence without commitment
So far in this section we have assumed that the seller can commit to its buy-later policy
when it rst meets the buyer, and we now discuss the outcome when this assumption is
relaxed. Suppose that the seller sets one price at the initial meeting with the buyer and
then a second price if the buyer returns to buy after discovering the outside option. We
assume the seller can make no commitment about the buy-later price at the rst meeting,
and the actual buy-later price can be discovered only after she returns to the seller. We
assume that buyers are rational, and foresee the sellers equilibrium price if they return
later. (At the end of this section we also discuss how lack of commitment a¤ects the sellers
ability to use the optimal mechanism.)
Here, unlike the rest of section 4, it makes an important di¤erence whether or not the
buyer faces an intrinsic cost of returning to the seller after search. In the simple case in
section 3, where there were no search costs of any form, we showed how the seller had an
incentive to o¤er a low buy-now price to prevent the buyer searching, even when it could
not commit to its buy-later price. A similar analysis carries over to the situation where
u is the buyers private information and search costs are present.22 In this case, however,
high-u buyers will purchase immediately, as in Coase (1972), leaving a pool of relatively
22For instance, in the running example where u and v are uniformly distributed on [0; 1] and the search
cost is s = 118 , the sellers most protable time-consistent strategy is to o¤er the buy-now price p1  0:251,
which induces the subgame-perfect buy-later price p2  0:286.
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low-u buyers who might purchase later. This adverse selection gives rise to a countervailing
incentive to set a low price for buy-later demand, and only when the search cost is not too
large will buy-now discounts be o¤ered in equilibrium.23
The outcome is more clear-cut in the situation in which a buyer incurs an exogenous
cost r > 0 to return to the seller after search. (Indeed, in the following we need not assume
that Q is logconcave, nor that u and v are independently distributed.) With an intrinsic
returning cost r > 0, no matter how small, there is no equilibrium with positive buy-later
demand. The fact that the buyer has chosen to incur the return cost to buy reveals that her
outside option was poor, and gives the seller an incentive to set a high buy-later price. In
essence, the sellers buy-later demand is perfectly inelastic around the buyers anticipated
buy-later price. As a result, any equilibrium involves a buyer either buying immediately
at the initial price, or searching but never returning. The seller will then choose its initial
price to maximize its prot, anticipating that no buyer will return, and the outcome is as
if it must make an exploding o¤er.24
Proposition 4 Suppose a buyer incurs a positive cost of returning to the seller after
search. Suppose the seller sets an initial price on a buyers rst visit, but cannot com-
mit to the price it will o¤er if the buyer decides to search and return later. Then the
unique equilibrium outcome is as if the seller makes an exploding o¤er.
Proof. Suppose by contrast that an equilibrium where some buyers return to purchase
after search exists. Consider a buyer who does not accept the initial price but returns to try
to buy from the seller after investigating the outside option. By revealed preference, such
a buyer must have taste parameters (u; v) and have anticipated a buy-later price pe2 such
23If a buyer can pretend to search (without incurring the search cost), then in a situation where the
buy-later price is lower than the buy-now price, all buyers can purchase at the low price and the outcome
is as if there is free recall.
24One can also derive the sellers policy under the alternative assumption that buyers are naive, in the
sense that they expect to be o¤ered the same price when they return after search as they were initially
o¤ered. When the seller sets initial price p1, therefore, a naive buyer who returns to try to buy later has
parameters (u; v) such that u  p1  r  v. Thus, the seller has an incentive to raise its price by at least r.
However, the incentive to inict a surprise price rise on naive buyers does not depend on there being an
intrinsic returning cost. Without a return cost, Figure 1 implies that buy-now demand from naive buyers
with initial price p1 is Q(p1 + a), and given p1 the rm chooses its subsequent price p2 to maximize prot
given that remaining buyers have type u  p1 + a. In our running example with uniform u and v and
s = 118 , one can check that the rms optimal policy is to set p1  0:262 followed by p2  0:310.
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that u  pe2   r > v. Suppose the seller actually sets a slightly higher buy-later price, say
pe2 + ". Though surprised, the buyer is willing to accept this o¤er if " < r. Therefore, the
seller has an incentive to raise its buy-later price above pe2, which contradicts the buyers
belief, and there can be no equilibrium in which the buyer returns to buy later if she does
not accept the initial price. Hence, the only possible equilibrium outcome in this setting
is as if the seller makes an exploding o¤er, and such an equilibrium exists under suitable
assumptions about the sellers beliefs about the buyers preferences if the latter does return
to buy. (For example, suppose the seller believes that a buyer who returns to purchase
later has taste parameters u = umax and v = 0, in which case it would charge p2 = umax.
Anticipating this, no buyer would incur the cost r to return to the seller.)
The seller makes greater prot with an exploding o¤er than with free recall only under
restrictive conditions. (Proposition 2 shows that when the demand curve is convex, free
recall is the more protable strategy.) As a commitment device, therefore, the seller might
welcome consumer protection policy which requires it to allow free recall.
In practice sellers themselves can usually nd ways to commit, at least partially, to
future prices if the buyer returns later. For example, the seller may be able to commit to
an upper bound on its buy-later price when a buyer rst visits. (In a store, this upper bound
might be the price label on the product, and a sales assistant has no authority to raise the
price above the displayed price.) Then, using the same argument as for Proposition 4, the
only equilibrium outcome is that the seller charges a buy-later price equal to this upper
bound if the buyer does not accept its initial o¤er. In this case, the buy-now discount
regime analyzed in section 4.1 can be implemented.
Likewise, if the buyer pays a deposit in the optimal mechanism, the seller may be legally
obliged to sell to the buyer later at the specied price. Suppose, though, that a buyer did
not pay the required deposit on her rst visit, so that the seller has made no commitment
to the price she will be o¤ered if she attempts to buy later. By the same argument as
in Proposition 4, the only equilibrium is that the sellers price for this returning buyer is
so disadvantageous that it is not worthwhile for the buyer to return. Thus, the optimal
mechanism studied in section 4.2 remains credible even if the seller cannot commit to refuse
to serve a buyer who did not contract for the right to buy later.
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5 Search Deterrence in Oligopoly
Up to this point the buyers outside option has been exogenous. However, the most natural
interpretation of the outside option is that it is an o¤er made by a rival seller. In this
nal section we extend the analysis to a duopoly market with strategic competitors, each
of which considers deterring search. Compared to our monopoly model, an important
di¤erence here is that a seller also meets buyers who have already encountered the rival
and know their outside option. We assume that a seller cannot tell whether or not a buyer
it meets for the rst time has already visited its rival, although we maintain the assumption
that a seller can distinguish whether a buyer is visiting it for the rst or for the second
time. The extension to duopoly allows us to consider the impact on equilibrium prot
and welfare when this form of price discrimination is used. (At least with commitment,
a monopoly seller can only benet from an ability to deter search, and in the monopoly
model we could not calculate welfare when the buyer consumes the outside option, as the
prot of the supplier of the outside option was not specied.)
As mentioned in section 3, uncertainty about the outside option v might concern the
match utility of the alternative product or its price. In the following, we present two
models: one with horizontally di¤erentiated products with uncertain match quality and
deterministic prices, and another with perfect substitutes and uncertain prices. In each
case, we show that search deterrence arises in equilibrium.
5.1 Di¤erentiated products
There are two symmetric sellers, 1 and 2, and a buyers utility from a sellers product is
an independent random draw from a common distribution with CDF F (u) and support
[0; umax]. As before, assume that monopoly demand Q(p)  1   F (p) satises (3). We
consider a game where sellers rst choose their selling procedures and prices, and then
buyers search sequentially. A buyer discovers one sellers match utility and selling policy
for free, but needs to incur the search cost s to discover the second sellers utility and
selling policy. Unless stated otherwise, we assume there is no intrinsic cost to return to a
previously visited seller and that a seller can commit to its selling policy when it meets a
buyer for the rst time.
26
We analyze the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in this market. Buyers do not observe a
sellers actual choice of price and sales policy before they start searching, but hold rational
expectations of rmsstrategies. Information unfolds as the search process goes on, but
buyersbeliefs about the o¤er made by the second seller are unchanged even if they see an
o¤-equilibrium o¤er from the rst seller. We focus on symmetric pure-strategy equilibria
in which sellers choose the same selling strategy and buyers visit sellers in a random order
(with half the buyers meeting seller 1 rst, and the remainder rst meeting seller 2).
Free recall : If both sellers allow free recall, the situation is a duopoly version of Wolinsky
(1986)s model of search. Dene
V (p)  Eu[maxf0; u  pg] =
Z umax
p
Q(u)du ; (11)
so that V (p)  s is the expected net benet of incurring search cost s to visit a monopolist
who charges p for its product. We assume that
s < V (p) ; (12)
where, as before, p is the price which maximizes pQ(p). Condition (12) implies a buyer is
willing to incur the cost s to visit a monopolist which charges the monopoly price.
Let pF be the symmetric equilibrium price in the free-recall regime, when a symmetric
equilibrium exists. Suppose for now that this equilibrium price is below the monopoly price
p, and so a buyer is willing to investigate the rival seller if the rst o¤er was disappointing.
To derive the equilibrium price we need to calculate a sellers demand if it sets a di¤erent
price, and suppose seller i chooses price p while seller j sets the equilibrium price pF .
Consider a buyer who visits seller i rst and nds match utility ui there. If she buys
immediately, her net surplus is ui   p, while if she chooses to search and visit seller j, her
expected net surplus is
Euj [maxfui   p; uj   pFg]  s = ui   p+ V (ui + pF   p)  s :
If we dene A by
V (A)  s ; (13)
then the buyer will buy immediately from seller i if and only if ui  A+ p  pF . Here, A
is the threshold match utility which induces immediate purchase when the two sellers o¤er
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the same price. (Since V () is a decreasing function, (12) and (13) imply that A > p.) If
the buyer chooses to investigate the second seller, she will then buy from the seller with
the greater net surplus, provided that surplus is non-negative. This pattern of demand
is depicted on Figure 4a, where the shaded area represents those buyers who purchase
neither product. On the other hand, if a buyer rst visits the rival seller j, this buyer
anticipates that seller i will o¤er the equilibrium price pF and so she buys immediately
from j if uj  A, and otherwise she investigates i and then chooses the superior option (if
that net surplus is positive). This case is depicted on Figure 4b.
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Figure 4: Demand in duopoly with free recall
In the appendix we derive the rst-order condition for the symmetric equilibrium price
pF . One can show that a symmetric equilibrium exists if the monopoly prot function,
pQ(p), is concave, and that the equilibrium price is indeed below the monopoly price p.
Unlike the monopoly setting, here there is always some buy-now demand in symmetric
equilibrium (provided s > 0), since if a buyer nds the highest possible match utility umax
at the rst seller, she does not expect to do better at the rival and will not search.
Search deterrence: Starting from the free-recall equilibrium, each sellers incentive to in-
troduce a buy-now discount or an exploding o¤er is as in the monopoly setting in section
4.1. An argument similar to that in Lemma 1 shows that a sellers buy-now demand in
Figure 4 is more elastic than its total demand given condition (3). Arguments similar
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to Propositions 1 and 2 then demonstrate when a seller has an incentive to introduce a
buy-now discount or make an exploding o¤er, as stated in the following result.25 ;26
Proposition 5 Starting from a free-recall equilibrium:
(i) a seller has a unilateral incentive to o¤er a buy-now discount;
(ii) if Q() is concave whenever Q > 0 a seller has a unilateral incentive to make an
exploding o¤er.
In the appendix we discuss how to derive the rst-order conditions for tari¤s when
both sellers use buy-now discounts or exploding o¤ers. In the regime with exploding o¤ers,
again a symmetric equilibrium exists if the monopoly prot function, pQ(p), is concave,
and the equilibrium price is then below the monopoly price p. In the regime of buy-now
discounts, though, it seems hard to provide a general condition which ensures the existence
of symmetric equilibrium. In either case, search deterrence arises whenever a symmetric
equilibrium exists, i.e., more buyers purchase immediately at the rst seller they nd than
would be the case with free recall.27
Similarly to our earlier Proposition 4, if sellers cannot commit to the buy-later price
but buyers incur an intrinsic cost of returning to a previously visited seller, a seller has an
incentive to hold-up a returning customer with a high buy-later price, with the result that
the only equilibrium is as if the sellers could only make exploding o¤ers.
One can also investigate the outcome when both sellers can use general (deterministic)
selling mechanisms, parallel to the monopoly analysis in section 4.2. However, the required
25A buy-later premium or an exploding o¤er made by seller i only a¤ects those buyers who visit it rst.
For them, their outside option when they rst meet seller i is maxf0; uj   pF g where j 6= i. Since the
arguments in the monopoly model did not rely on the distribution of the outside option, the same results
hold with duopoly.
26As shown in Armstrong and Zhou (2011), this result holds with any nite number of sellers. In the
limiting case with an innite number of sellers, though, with free-recall buyers never return once they
leave a seller. Therefore, there is no buy-later demand and no way for sellers to deter search by making it
harder to buy later.
27In the free-recall regime, a buyer will purchase immediately at the rst seller if u  A. In the regime
with exploding o¤ers and a symmetric price p < p(< A), a buyer with match utility u at her rst seller
will accept the exploding o¤er if u  p  V (p)  s. Hence the threshold utility for immediate purchase is
p+ V (p)  s = p+ V (p)  V (A) < A, where the inequality arises since V () is a decreasing function with
slope greater than  1. In a symmetric equilibrium with buy-now discount  , Figure 7a in the appendix
shows that the threshold utility for immediate purchase is V  1(s + ) +  , which is also smaller than
A = V  1(s) since V  1() is a decreasing function with slope less than  1.
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analysis for duopoly is substantially more complex than that for monopoly. The main rea-
son is that when a buyer comes to the seller for the rst time, she has another dimension
of private information which is whether or not she has already visited the rival and ob-
tained her outside option (and if so, what that outside option is), which entails solving a
multidimensional screening problem.28 Similarly to Proposition 3 in the monopoly model,
it turns out that a seller can restrict attention to a simple family of mechanisms:
Proposition 6 Suppose sellers use general (deterministic) selling mechanisms. Then it
is without loss of generality to look for a symmetric equilibrium where each seller o¤ers a
buy-now price and a menu of deposit contracts.
(The proof of this proposition is contained in a separate online appendix. There we also
provide the procedure to derive the symmetric equilibrium with general selling mechanisms,
if it exists, and the details of the equilibrium mechanism in the uniform example presented
below.29 As in Corollary 1 it is also shown that search deterrence occurs whenever a
symmetric equilibrium exists.)
As with the regime of buy-now discounts it is hard to derive a general condition which
ensures the existence of a symmetric equilibrium in which sellers use general selling mech-
anisms. For this reason, in the remainder of this section we focus on the example of a
uniform distribution, so that Q(p) = 1  p, in which case symmetric equilibrium exists in
all four regimes. Condition (12) requires s < 1
8
in this example, and so in the following
gures outcomes are plotted as a function of the search cost over the range 0  s  1
8
.
28Deb and Said (2014) study a related model in the context of monopoly. They extend Courty and Li
(2000) by introducing a group of buyers who arrive at the second period, alongside rst-period buyers who
may have chosen to delay their purchase. The seller therefore faces a multidimensional screening problem
in the second period. Like us, for reasons of tractability they focus on deterministic mechanisms.
29In more detail, the mechanism each seller uses is as follows. A seller asks a buyer it meets whether
or not she already knows her outside option. If she reports she does not, she participates in a mechanism
of the form used in the monopoly analysis (restricted to be deterministic). If she reports she does know
her outside option already, she is asked to report both the value of the outside option and her utility at
the seller, and contingent on that report she either obtains the sellers product at a specied price, or
she obtains nothing from the seller. Of course, the buyer must be induced to report truthfully whether
she already knows her outside option. In equilibrium, a seller cannot perfectly infer whether a rst-time
visitor has already visited the rival or not. Both the high-valuation buyers who visit the seller rst and
the buyers who come after visiting the rival (if they eventually buy from the seller) choose the buy-now
price.
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Figure 5a depicts the equilibrium prices in the four regimes. The free-recall price is
depicted as the dashed curve, and the three solid curves respectively as we move upwards
represent the buy-now price in the equilibrium general mechanism, the buy-now price in
the buy-now discount scheme, and the exploding-o¤er price. When buy-now discounts or
exploding o¤ers are used, even the buy-now price is higher than the free-recall price, so
buyers end up paying more. The intuition is that search deterrence adds to frictions in
the market, and this allows sellers to charge higher prices. When sellers compete with
general mechanisms, the buy-now price is slightly lower than the free-recall price, but the
buy-later price (at which a buyer can return to buy a sellers product without paying a
deposit) is signicantly higher. (The latter is depicted as the dotted line on the gure.)
The e¤ect of search deterrence on market prices is the most signicant when the search
cost is small. When the search cost approaches its maximum level which allows search to
occur, buy-later demand becomes negligible even with free recall, and all prices converge
to the monopoly price p = 1
2
.
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Figure 5: Buy-now prices and prots in four regimes
Figure 5b compares industry prot in the four regimes. Prot with free recall is rep-
resented by the dashed curve, while the three solid curves depict respectively as we move
downwards the regimes of buy-now discounts, general mechanisms and exploding o¤ers.
The use of exploding o¤ers and general mechanisms always reduces industry prot, while
buy-now discounts reduce prots unless the search cost is small. Search deterrence reduces
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prot because it leads to high prices which exclude too many buyers.30 Because prot
usually falls when sellers induce buyer to purchase immediately, sellers might welcome a
consumer protection policy which prevents their use of these tactics, if such regulation was
feasible and applied to all sellers in the market.31
Figure 6a shows the proportion of all buyers who purchase immediately at the rst
seller i.e., the fraction who do not search in this example. (From top to bottom, the
curves correspond to the regimes with exploding o¤ers, buy-now discounts, general mech-
anisms, and free recall.) As one would expect, this fraction increases with the intrinsic
search cost s in each case. Again, the impact of search deterrence is most marked when
s is small. Here, few buyers buy immediately with free recall, since there is usually some
chance they will nd a better o¤er from the second seller, but with an exploding o¤er 40%
of buyers purchase without search.
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Figure 6: Search deterrence and welfare in four regimes
Thus, at least in this example, when sellers can recognize customers and pursue the
various sales tactics, prices rise and search is deterred. As a result buyers are harmed
twice: the chosen product is on average a less good match with their tastes, and they
30In the regime of general mechanisms, the fraction of buyers who leave the market without purchasing
anything is the product of the buy-now price and the buy-later price. As we have seen, the former is
slightly lower but the latter is much higher than the free-recall price, and net e¤ect is that more buyers
are excluded from the market.
31Recall from the introduction how a number of law journals collectively agreed to stop making exploding
o¤ers to authors.
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pay more for this product. (With general mechanisms, although those buyers who buy
immediately without search pay a slightly lower price, consumer surplus is still lower than
in the free-recall regime.) Figure 6b shows total welfare consumer surplus plus industry
prot in the four regimes. (From bottom to top, the curves correspond to exploding
o¤ers, buy-now discounts, general mechanisms, and free recall.) As is intuitive, these sales
tactics cause limited harm in a market with signicant intrinsic search frictions, since there
is then little buy-later demand even with free recall. When intrinsic frictions are small,
though, the extra friction induced by these tactics lead to signicant welfare losses.
5.2 A homogeneous product
Suppose there are two sellers with costless production which compete to supply a homo-
geneous product. All buyers have the same value u for a unit of this product. One way to
generate price uncertainty in an equilibrium model is to suppose that a fraction of buyers
see only one sellers price, while others see more prices, in which case sellers choose their
prices according to a mixed strategy. (For instance, see Varian (1980) for a model of this
form.) In this spirit, suppose each buyer is sure to nd one random seller (with each seller
equally likely to be found rst), and with exogenous probability 0 <  < 1 she can discover
the second seller as well. A buyer searches sequentially through her available options, but
without incurring search costs. We assume she does not know if she will be able to nd
the second seller at the time she meets the rst seller.
Free recall : Consider rst the outcome when sellers permit a potential buyer to purchase
later at the same price originally o¤ered. Since there are no search costs, when sellers allow
free recall we assume that each buyer will search through all available options and buy from
the seller with the lower price. A seller will be visited rst by half of the buyers, and a
fraction  of them will nd the second seller. It follows that each seller has 1 
2
captive
buyers, while  buyers visit both sellers. Then, as is familiar from the previous literature,
the assumption 0 <  < 1 implies that in equilibrium sellers choose prices according to a
continuous mixed strategy with support [pmin; u], where pmin is the smallest price chosen
in equilibrium by a seller.
In more detail, suppose the equilibrium mixed strategy is for a seller to choose its price
33
to be above p with probability X(p). Then the condition for a seller to be indi¤erent
between all prices in the range [pmin; u] is that
1  
2
+ X(p)

p =
1  
2
u : (14)
The left-hand side is a sellers prot when it chooses price p, where the term [] is the number
of buyers who buy from this seller given that its rival chooses a higher price with probability
X(p). The right-hand side is the prot when the seller charges the monopoly price u (in
which case only its captive buyers buy). The lower bound of the price distribution is
pmin =
1  
1 + 
u :
If there are limited search frictions, in the sense that   1, then equilibrium prot is small
and prices are usually close to zero.
Note that if a seller allows free recall and chooses the monopoly price u, it is sure to
achieve at least the free-recall level of prot 1 
2
u, regardless of the selling policies followed
by its rival. (When it does this, it sells at least to those buyers it meets who are captive.)
Thus, in contrast to the previous model with product di¤erentiation, here there can be no
equilibrium with search deterrence in which sellers make lower prot than with free recall.
Search deterrence: Given that its rival allows free recall and follows the mixed pricing
strategy dened in (14), a seller with commitment power has a strict incentive to make an
exploding o¤er. Free recall, therefore, is not an equilibrium strategy in this market when
sellers are able to discriminate against buyers who wish to purchase after search.
Proposition 7 Suppose sellers can commit to a buy-later policy when they meet a buyer
for the rst time. Then both sellers allowing free recall is not an equilibrium.
Proof. In the free-recall regime with mixed pricing strategy in (14) with support [pmin; u],
a sellers potential buyers can be divided into two groups: those who meet it rst (and
who may or may not be able to nd the rival subsequently) and those who already have
an o¤er from the rival. Suppose a seller deviates and makes an exploding o¤er with price
p > pmin. The latter group of buyers are not a¤ected, and will buy with probability X(p),
just as with free recall at price p. So the e¤ect of making an exploding o¤er stems from the
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rst group alone. Given the exploding o¤er, a buyer who visits the seller rst will accept
it if her surplus u p is greater than her expected surplus from searching for the (possible)
second option, E~p[u  ~p], which must be strictly less than u  pmin. Therefore, when p is
close to pmin this buyer will accept the exploding o¤er for sure, while with free recall at the
same price the buyer accepts only with probability 1 +X(p) < 1. If a seller makes an
exploding o¤er with price su¢ ciently close to pmin, we deduce that a sellers prot strictly
increases relative to when it allows free recall at any price in the range [pmin; u].
When sellers can use any selling mechanism, it is complicated in this model to fully
investigate all possible equilibria. However, one simple equilibrium is that each seller makes
an exploding o¤er at the monopoly price u. Given a buyer holds this expectation, she will
then buy from the rst seller she meets since she does not expect to nd a strictly better
o¤er and there is the chance 1   she will end up with nothing if she rejects.32 Given this
search behaviour, the only buyers a seller meets are those who have it rst in their search
order. If this seller makes an exploding o¤er at price u, it makes monopoly prot u from
each buyer it meets. This is the maximum prot it could extract if these buyers had no
outside option at all, and so this seller cannot do better with any other selling scheme. In
essence, the articial search frictions introduced by exploding o¤ers causes the Diamond
Paradox to re-emerge, and prices to rise to the monopoly level.33
In this equilibrium with exploding o¤ers, industry prot rises and consumer surplus
falls, relative to the situation with free recall. This equilibrium corresponds to the outcome
where sellers collude to maximize industry prots, and so search deterrence provides a
decentralized means to achieve collusion in this market.
32Here, as usual with unit demand models, we are assuming that when a buyer is indi¤erent between
accepting a sellers o¤er and buying nothing, she accepts the o¤er. The buyer would strictly prefer to
purchase at the monopoly price for sure, rather than have a chance of being left with nothing, in a richer
model where buyers had positive surplus at the monopoly price (e.g., if buyers had downward-sloping
demand or heterogeneous values u for the homogeneous product).
33There is no price below the monopoly price which is an equilibrium with exploding o¤ers. To see this,
consider a hypothetical equilibrium where sellers makes exploding o¤ers at price p < u. Suppose one seller
now unilaterally raises its price to ~p > p. This seller only encounters buyers for whom it is rst in their
search order, and such a buyer is willing to accept the higher price if u  ~p > (u  p), which is satised
for ~p close to p given  < 1. Therefore, p = u is the unique equilibrium price with exploding o¤ers.
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6 Conclusions
The analysis in this paper suggests that search deterrence is privately protable, yet plau-
sibly leads to welfare losses. Articial search frictions drive up prices and (where relevant)
reduce the quality of the match between product and consumer. These two kinds of harm
can induce fewer buyers to buy, with the result that sellers in equilibrium can also be made
worse o¤ when these sales tactics are used.
Public policy might attempt to limit the use of such tactics. For instance, the Unfair
Commercial Practices Directive, adopted in 2005 across the European Union, prohibits
sellers in all circumstances falsely stating that a product will only be available for a very
limited time, or that it will only be available on particular terms for a very limited time,
in order to elicit an immediate decision and deprive consumers of su¢ cient opportunity
or time to make an informed choice. Nevertheless, the enforcement of such policies will
inevitably be di¢ cult given the casual nature of much sales interaction and the frequency
with which discounts from regular prices are o¤ered. A less direct but possibly more
e¤ective method to control aggressive sales techniques is to require a cooling o¤period
for specied products, as is currently done in many jurisdictions. If a salesman manages
to convince a consumer to buy immediately, through whatever means, the consumer then
has the ability to cancel the deal within a specied period if she discovers a better deal
elsewhere.
Our analysis could usefully be extended in a number of directions. In this paper,
search deterrence required that a seller be able to recognize its customers. However, one
could investigate if other selling techniques can protably deter search when consumers are
anonymous. Flash sales, or short-run discounts, are a common marketing tactic, and a
number of daily dealwebsites operate on the internet. A discount which is known to be
short-lived can deter search, since consumers may be unable to take advantage of it if they
take the time needed to search. In a similar vein, a seller which suggests that its price is
likely to rise soon may deter search. For example, an airlines website might report there
is only one seat left at this pricewhen a traveller checks for current fares.
A way to deter search, which involves a more standard kind of customer recognition than
studied in this paper, is to o¤er dynamic quantity discounts. Suppose a buyer potentially
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purchases the sellers product repeatedly, and can nd alternatives to the product over
time as well. If the buyer agrees to a long-term contract such that subsequent units are
relatively cheap, she becomes less inclined to search for an alternative. For instance, if the
buyer agrees to buy from the seller for two periods, she has less incentive to search for
an alternative between periods, relative to a situation where the seller o¤ers a sequence of
one-period contracts. The analysis in this paper suggests that it will often be protable,
though not necessarily welfare-enhancing, for a seller to induce a buyer to accept a long-
term contract in ignorance of her subsequent o¤ers.34
One could also consider situations where a seller has some knowledge of the buyers
outside option. If the seller has information that the outside option is bad for the consumer,
it may disclose this information to deter search. For example, a gas station might display
a sign stating last fuel for 20 miles, or cheapest fuel in town. (The credibility of such
statements will determine how consumers react to them.) On the other hand, a seller
who knows the outside option is likely to be attractive might make an exploding o¤er to
prevent its discovery by the buyer. When a sellers choice of buy-later policy can be made
contingent on the outside option, a savvy buyer might then use the sellers policy as a
signal of her outside option.
Although we analyzed a model with rational buyers, it is natural to consider the psy-
chological impact of these sales tactics. Behavioural factors might make these tactics more
or less e¤ective than predicted in our model. If some buyers are susceptible in general terms
to sales pressure, it may be that these tactics are even more e¤ective than our model
with rational buyers suggests. (For instance, a seller might attempt to make a potential
customer feel badif the latter suggests she wants to get a second quote before deciding
to buy.) On the other hand, some buyers may be antagonized by aggressive selling. Brown,
Viriyavipart, and Wang (2014) describe an experiment in which human sellers face either
human or robot buyers, and choose their price and whether their o¤er involves free recall
or an exploding o¤er. Buyer valuations were randomly chosen so that exploding o¤ers were
optimal if buyers were rational (as the robots were programmed to be). However, human
34A similar issue has been explored in the labour market context, where a dynamic wage contract in
which the wage increases with employment tenure can act to deter on-the-job search e¤orts by employees.
For instance, see Stevens (2004).
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buyers rejected exploding o¤ers more often than rational buyers would, and sellers learned
that exploding o¤ers were less protable than when playing against robot buyers. Just as
buyers who shop around induce sellers to set low prices in conventional models of search,
buyers who refuse to engage with high-pressure sales tactics may induce sellers to adopt a
less aggressive approach.
APPENDIX: Proofs and Omitted Analysis
Proof of Proposition 1: Let pF be the optimal free-recall price. As we can see from
Figure 1, buy-now demand vanishes if and only if pF+a  umax. Consider rst the situation
with positive buy-now demand in the free-recall regime, so that pF + a < umax. (Clearly,
this requires condition (5) to hold.)
Since pF maximizes p[q1(p) + q2(p)], it follows that
 pF q01(pF )
q1(pF )
q1(pF )
q1(pF ) + q2(pF )
+
 pF q02(pF )
q2(pF )
q2(pF )
q1(pF ) + q2(pF )
= 1 ;
so that an average of the two demand elasticities equals 1. (Since qi(pF ) > 0, the weight
on each elasticity is positive.) Lemma 1 implies that q1 is strictly more elastic than q2, and
so it follows that q2 has elasticity less than 1 at pF , i.e.,
q2(pF ) + pF q
0
2(pF ) > 0 : (15)
For the purposes of this proof, let x1(p1; p2) and x2(p1; p2) denote respectively the buy-
now and buy-later demands with (non-uniform) prices p1 and p2, so that qi(p)  xi(p; p).
Then
@
@p2
[p1x1(p1; p2) + p2x2(p1; p2)] = p1
@x1(p1; p2)
@p2
+ p2
@x2(p1; p2)
@p2
+ x2(p1; p2)
= p1
@x2(p1; p2)
@p1
+ p2
@x2(p1; p2)
@p2
+ x2(p1; p2) :
Here, the second equality follows from Slutsky symmetry @x1=@p2  @x2=@p1, which is
an implication of rational consumer choice. (This can be veried directly using Figure 2.)
Setting p1 = p2 = pF in the above yields
@
@p2
[p1x1(p1; p2) + p2x2(p1; p2)]

p1=p2=pF
= pF q
0
2(pF ) + q2(pF ) > 0 ;
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where the inequality follows from (15). We deduce that, starting from the most protable
free-recall price pF , increasing the buy-later price will boost prot.
Next, we show the result also holds if buy-now demand is zero, so that pF + a  umax,
provided condition (5) holds. Suppose the seller o¤ers buy-later price p2 = pF and buy-
now price p1 which satises umax = pF + S 1(s+ pF   p1). From Figure 2 we see that the
type-umax buyer is just indi¤erent between buying immediately and keeping searching. In
other words, this buy-now-discount scheme generates the same demand pattern and prot
as the free-recall price pF . Since S(a) = s, we can write p1 explicitly as
pF   p1 =
Z a
umax pF
(1 G(v))dv : (16)
Note that 0 < p1  pF given that pF + a  umax and that a  umax in (5).35
Suppose the seller further decreases its buy-now price by a small " (such that the buy-
now price is still positive). Then those buyers with u close to umax now buy immediately.
Figure 2 implies that the buyer type who is indi¤erent between buying now and buying
later is u(") = pF + S 1(s+ pF   p1 + "). The sellers prot is then
(")  (p1   ")Q(u(")) + pF
Z u(")
pF
G(u  pF )dF (u) ;
where Q(u(")) is the buy-now demand and the integral term is the buy-later demand.
Using the facts u(0) = umax and u0(") < 0, one can check that 0(0) has the same sign as
p1   pFG(umax   pF ) :
(Intuitively, this is the benet from inducing a buyer with u  umax to buy immediately:
the seller earns p1 if the buyer buys immediately, and if she searches on she will return with
probability G(umax   pF ) in which case the seller earns pF .) Using (16) and the condition
a  umax, one can check that this expression is positive. Therefore, even if there is no
buy-now demand in the free-recall regime, o¤ering a buy-now discount is more protable
than allowing free recall.
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider a two-stage direct mechanism consisting of the func-
tions fx(u0); (q0(u0); t0(u0)); (q(u0; v0); t(u0; v0))g. In the rst stage, the buyer is required to
35Given a  umax, we have pF   p1 = S(umax   pF )  s  S(a  pF )  s. One can then check that the
buy and searchoption discussed in footnote 18 is irrelevant.
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report her valuation for the sellers product, u0. She is then instructed either to cease her
search or to investigate the outside option.36 With probability x(u0), she is instructed to
stop searching, in which case the buyer pays t0(u0) and obtains the product with probabil-
ity q0(u0). With probability 1   x(u0), she is instructed to investigate the outside option.
In that case she is required to report the realization of the outside option, v0. Then contin-
gent on the two reports, the buyer pays t(u0; v0) and obtains the product with probability
q(u0; v0).
Given this mechanism, dene
U(u; u0; v; v0)  maxfu; vgq(u0; v0) + v(1  q(u0; v0))  t(u0; v0)  s : (17)
This is the type-(u; v) buyers expected surplus if she is instructed to search for the outside
option after reporting u0 in the rst stage and then reports v0 in the second stage. (If the
buyer obtains both the product and the outside option, she consumes the better option.)
According to the revelation principle in a dynamic setting (see Myerson, 1986), without loss
of generality we can focus on direct mechanisms such that (i) the buyer reports truthfully
in the second stage if she has been truthful in the rst stage and has been instructed to
search, so that
U(u; u; v; v) = max
v0
: U(u; u; v; v0) ; (18)
and (ii) the buyer reports truthfully in the rst stage, so that
(u)  x(u)[uq0(u)  t0(u)] + (1  x(u))Ev[U(u; u; v; v)]
= max
u0
: x(u0)[uq0(u0)  t0(u0)] + (1  x(u0))Ev[max
v0
U(u; u0; v; v0)] : (19)
Note that if the buyer has lied in the rst stage (u0 6= u), she is able and in general has
an incentive to lie again in the second stage (so v0 6= v).37 Here, (u) dened in (19) is
36We assume that the seller is able to monitor whether the buyer does as instructed, and the buyer is
not able to step out the door and back in againwithout incurring the search cost. However, the solution
to the sellers problem assuming this monitoring ability which is as described in Proposition 3 does not
in fact require that the seller monitors search activity, and so this assumption plays no role.
37In the literature on sequential screening, a strong truthtelling condition is often imposed, which
requires that the agent reports truthfully even if she previously lied. For example, see Courty and Li
(2000), Krahmer and Strausz (2011), and section 5 of Pavan, Segal, and Toikka (2014). This is because
in their settings, an agents reporting incentives depend only on her previous reports, but not on whether
those reports were truthful. Using our notation, this would be the case if U did not depend on the true u.
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the buyers surplus from participating in the mechanism. It is clear that  is an increasing
function, and one can also show it is convex. From (19), the envelope theorem implies that
0(u) = x(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u)) @
@u
Ev[U(u; u0; v; v)]

u0=u
= x(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
q(u; v)dG(v) ; (20)
where the second equality follows the denition of U in (17) which implies @
@u
U(u; u0; v; v) =
q(u0; v) if u > v, and @
@u
U(u; u0; v; v) = 0 otherwise. Here, (20) is the probability that the
type-u buyer consumes the sellers product, i.e., that the product is given to the buyer and
that she prefers the product to the outside option if the latter is discovered.
The sellers problem is to choose fx; q0; t0; q; tg in order to maximize its protZ umax
0
fx(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)]gdF (u)
subject to the pair of incentive constraints (18)(19) and the participation constraint
(u)  v  s. (It is without loss of generality to assume that the seller o¤ers a mechanism
which is accepted by all buyers, as the non-participation option can be made available
within the mechanism.)
We rst solve a relaxedproblem by imposing the participation constraint and only
the local incentive compatibility constraint (20). From the denition of U in (17) and (u)
in (19), the prot from the type-u buyer is
x(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)] =
x(u)uq0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
(u  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

  (u) : (21)
Therefore, the sellers prot can be written as
 =
Z umax
0

x(u)uq0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
(u  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

  (u)

dF (u) :
In such cases, the incentive for a type-u0 buyer to report truthfully in the second stage on the equilibrium
path implies that a type-u buyer will report truthfully in the second stage even after reporting u0 (rather
than u) in the rst stage. Because of this di¤erence we cannot impose the strong truthtelling constraint
in our model. Without a strong truthtelling constraint, the incentive compatibility condition in the rst
stage is more complicated than in the usual case since we need to consider the optimal lying strategy in
the second stage.
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Using Z umax
0
(u)dF (u) = (0) +
Z umax
0
0(u)[1  F (u)]du
and (20), we can rewrite this prot asZ umax
0

x(u)(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
((u)  v)q(u; v)dG(v) + v   s

dF (u)  (0) ;
(22)
where () is given in (7).
This expression can be maximized point-wise with respect to x, q0 and q, where each
of these probabilities is constrained to lie between 0 and 1. This implies that q0(u) = 1 if
and only if (u)  0, i.e., if u  p, where p is the monopoly price. This also implies
q(u; v) =

1 if v  (u)
0 otherwise
: (23)
In particular, both q0 and q are zero when u < p, and in this range the buyer never obtains
the product. From (22), in this range it is therefore optimal to set x(u) = 0. Substituting
q(u; v) in (23) we obtainZ u
0
[((u)  v)q(u; v)]dG(v) =
Z (u)
0
[(u)  v]dG(v) =
Z (u)
0
G(v)dv :
For convenience, we introduce the following notation:
R(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg   v] = S(x) + x  v =
Z x
0
G(v)dv : (24)
Here, R(x) measures the ex ante benet to the buyer of being able to return to obtain
surplus x from the seller once she has discovered her outside option v.
Then the sellers prot (22) simplies to
 =
Z umax
p
[x(u)(u) + (1  x(u)) fR((u)) + v   sg] dF (u) + F (p)(v   s)  (0) : (25)
From (24) we know that R((u)) = S((u))+(u) v, and so the fg term in the integrand
is greater than (u) if and only if (u)  a, i.e., if u  u^ where (u^) = a. Therefore, it
is optimal to set x(u) = 0 if u  u^ and otherwise to set x(u) = 1. Together with the
participation constraint (0) = v   s, this implies that prot in (25) is
 =
Z u^
p
[R((u)) + v   s] dF (u) +
Z umax
u^
(u)dF (u)  (1  F (p))(v   s) : (26)
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Since Z umax
u^
(u)dF (u) = u^(1  F (u^)) ;
(26) simplies further to
 =
Z u^
p
R((u))dF (u) + (1  F (u^))(u^  (v   s)) : (27)
The prot (27) achieved in the relaxed problem is an upper bound on the prot achiev-
able when we impose all incentive constraints. We show next that the selling mechanism
described in Proposition 3 is implementable and generates prot equal to (27). We can
then conclude that the selling mechanism in Proposition 3 is indeed the optimal selling
mechanism.
If buyers behave as described in the statement of Proposition 3, the sellers prot is
^  (1  F (u^))P +
Z u^
p
[D(u) + p(u)G((u))] dF (u) : (28)
Using R() dened in (24), we can rewrite D(u) in (8) as
D(u) = R((u)) 
Z u
p
G((t))dt : (29)
ThenZ u^
p
D(u)dF (u) =
Z u^
p
R((u))dF (u) 
Z u^
p
Z u
p
G((t))dt

dF (u)
=
Z u^
p
R((u))dF (u) 
Z u^
p
p(u)G((u))dF (u) + (1  F (u^))
Z u^
p
G((u))du :
(The second equality is from integration by parts and the denition of p(u) in (9).) Sub-
stituting this into (28) and using the expression for P = D(u^) + p(u^) = D(u^) + u^   a
yields
^ =
Z u^
p
R((u))dF (u) + (1  F (u^))
Z u^
p
G((u))du+D(u^) + u^  a

=
Z u^
p
R((u))dF (u) + (1  F (u^))(u^  (v   s)) :
(The second equality used the expression for D(u^) in (29) and v   s = a  R(a).) This is
exactly the prot in (27).
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The nal step in our argument is to show that the type-u buyer chooses the appropriate
contract in the statement of Proposition 3. Denote by (u0; u) a type-u buyers expected
surplus if she chooses a deposit contract (D(u0); p(u0)) with u0 2 [p; u^]. Then
(u0; u) = Ev[maxfv; u  p(u0)g] D(u0)  s
= R(u  p(u0)) D(u0) + v   s :
It follows that
@(u0; u)
@u0
= p0(u0) [G(u0   p(u0)) G(u  p(u0))] : (30)
First, consider a buyer with u > u^. Her surplus from buying the sellers product
immediately without search is u   P . If she chooses one of the deposit contracts, her
maximum surplus will be (u^; u) since (30) is positive for u0 2 [p; u^] and u > u^. But
(u^; u) = R(u  p(u^)) D(u^) + v   s
= a D(u^) +
Z u p(u^)
a
G(v)dv
< u  p(u^) D(u^) = u  P : (31)
(The second equality used v   s = a   R(a), the inequality follows because u   p(u^) >
(u^) = a, and the last equality used the fact that P = D(u^) + p(u^).) Therefore, this buyer
has no incentive to choose a deposit contract. On the other hand,
u  P > u^  P = u^  p(u^) D(u^) = (u^) D(u^) > a R(a) = v   s :
(The second inequality follows from D(u^) < R((u^)) = R(a).) So this buyer has no
incentive to consume the outside option for sure either.38
Second, consider a buyer with type u 2 [p; u^]. Then (30) implies that (u0; u) is single-
peaked in u0 and maximized by setting u0 = u. One can also check that (u; u)  v   s,
so this buyer does not wish to consume the outside option for sure. In addition, we have
(u; u)  (u^; u)  u   P . (The last step here follows the same logic as in (31), but now
38Finally, one can check that these buyers do not wish to pursue the buy and searchstrategy. If such
a buyer purchases the item at price P and searches, her expected surplus is Ev[maxfu; vg]   P   s, and
this is below her surplus if she buys without further search, u   P , when s  Ev[maxfu; vg]   u = S(u),
i.e., if u  a. However, this is the case since u^  a.
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u   p(u^)  a and so the inequality is reversed.) Hence, this buyer does not wish to buy
immediately either.
Finally, consider a buyer with type u < p. If she chooses a deposit contract, the
maximum surplus is (p; u) = v   s since (30) is negative for u0 2 [p; u^] and u < p.
Likewise,
u  P < p   P = p   p(u^) R(a) +
Z u^
p
G((t))dt < u^  p(u^) R(a) = v   s :
(The rst equality used P = D(u^)+p(u^) and (29), and the second equality used u^ p(u^) =
(u^) = a.) Therefore, the optimal choice for a buyer with u < p is to consume the outside
option for sure.
Analysis for free recall, buy-now discounts and exploding o¤ers in section 5.1:
Free recall: By examining Figure 4, one sees that seller is demand, when it deviates to p
and seller j charges the equilibrium price pF , is
1
2
(1 + F (A)) (1  F (A  pF + p)) +
Z A
pF
F (u)f(u+ p  pF )du :
In equilibrium it equals 1
2
(1  F (pF )2) since a fraction F (pF )2 of buyers buy from neither
seller. The rst-order condition for pF to be the equilibrium price is
1  F (pF )2
pF
= f(A)(1 + F (A))  2
Z A
pF
F (u)f 0(u)du : (32)
As we showed in our working paper, Armstrong and Zhou (2011, Lemma 1), conditions
(3) and (12) imply that (32) has a solution which satises pF < p. Moreover, if pQ(p) is
concave, the rst-order condition is also su¢ cient for pF to be the equilibrium price.
In the uniform distribution example with F (p) = p, condition (32) becomes 1   p2F =
(1 +A)pF , where A = 1 
p
2s, and solving this equation yields the price and prot shown
above in Figure 5.
Buy-now discounts: Here we derive the symmetric equilibrium tari¤ (P; ), where P is the
buy-now price and  is the buy-later premium (so the buy-later price is P + ). Suppose
seller i deviates to (Pi;  i). It is without loss of generality that we consider deviations
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restricted to  i  V (P )  s.39 For a buyer who visits seller i rst and values its product at
ui, her surplus is ui   Pi if she buys immediately. If she chooses to search and visit seller
j, her expected surplus is
Euj [maxfui   (Pi +  i); uj   Pg]  s = ui   (Pi +  i) + V (ui   (Pi +  i) + P )  s :
Therefore, this buyer will buy immediately if and only if  i > V (ui   (Pi +  i) + P )   s,
i.e., if ui > V  1(s+  i) +  i +Pi P . If she visits both sellers, she will return to buy from
i if ui   (Pi +  i) > uj   P . The pattern of demand for these buyers who rst visit seller
i is depicted on Figure 7a. Buyers who rst visit seller j hold equilibrium beliefs about
seller is pricing strategy, and so their demand is as shown on Figure 7b.
With the help of these gures, one can obtain expressions for a sellers total demand
and buy-later demand, and use these to obtain the rst-order conditions for (P; ) to be an
equilibrium within the set of buy-now discount pricing schemes. (See Armstrong and Zhou,
2011, section 3.2 for more detail.) Consider the case of a uniform distribution example,
where F (p) = p and V  1(x) = 1 p2x. As in the monopoly case, in this example seller is
buy-later demand does not depend on its buy-now price Pi and its total demand does not
depend on its buy-later premium  i. As a result, seller is prot is additively separable in
 i and Pi. Here, the absence of cross-price e¤ects greatly simplies the prot function and
enables us to show that equilibrium exists.
-
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Figure 7: Demand in duopoly with a buy-now discount
39As can be seen from Figure 7a, when  i > V (P )   s, buy-later demand disappears and is prot is
independent of  i. Hence, our restriction to  i  V (P )  s is without loss of generality.
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Figure 7 shows that in symmetric equilibrium a fraction P (P+) of buyers buy nothing,
and each sellers total demand is 1
2
(1   P (P + )). Similarly to the free-recall case, the
rst-order condition for the buy-now price P is
1  P (P + ) = (1 + V  1(s+ ) + )P :
Since a sellers choice of  i does not a¤ect its total demand, but only the proportion of
buy-later demand, a seller chooses  i to maximize its revenue from those who buy later.
Figure 7a implies that the volume of seller is buy-later demand is 1
2
((V  1(s+  i))2 P 2),
and so the rst-order condition for the buy-later premium  is
(V  1(s+ ))2   P 2 =  2V  1(s+ )(V  1)0(s+ ) :
Numerically solving this pair of rst-order conditions yields the prices and prots shown
above on Figure 5.
Exploding o¤ers: Finally, we examine the equilibrium prices when exploding o¤ers are
made. Suppose the equilibrium price is P . If seller i deviates and sets price Pi, its total
demand is
1
2
Q(Pi + V (P )  s) + 12 [1 Q(P + V (P )  s)]Q(Pi) : (33)
Here, the rst term represents demand from those buyers who rst visit seller i: if they
have match utility ui, they will accept is exploding o¤er if ui   Pi  V (P )   s. The
second term is the demand from those buyers who rst visit the rival: a buyer will reject
the rivals exploding o¤er if uj   P < V (P )   s, since they anticipate that seller i o¤ers
the equilibrium price P , and then they buy from i if ui  Pi. The rst-order condition for
P to be a symmetric equilibrium price is therefore
Q(P + V (P )  s) + (1 Q(P + V (P )  s))Q(P )+
P [Q0(P + V (P )  s) + (1 Q(P + V (P )  s))Q0(P )] = 0
As shown in Armstrong and Zhou (2011, Lemma 3), conditions (3) and (12) imply that
this rst-order condition has a solution which satises P < p. If pQ(p) is concave, the
rst-order condition is su¢ cient for P to be the equilibrium price.
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In the uniform example, where V (P ) = 1
2
(1 P )2, the rst-order condition for equilib-
rium price P simplies to
P (2  2s+ P 2) = 1 :
Solving this rst-order condition yields the price and prot shown above on Figure 5.
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Online Appendix (not for publication)
This online appendix reports the details for the general selling mechanism in the
duopoly model in section 5.1. The key step in solving for a symmetric equilibrium mech-
anism is to study a sellers best response when the rival o¤ers the equilibrium mechanism
and buyers hold equilibrium beliefs.40 This is the same as studying the optimal selling
mechanism in an extended monopoly model where the seller faces two groups of buyer:
one group visits the seller rst and do not know their outside option yet, while the other
group knows their outside option when they rst visit the seller. We will show that in this
extended monopoly model it is without loss of generality to look for the optimal mechanism
among the class of mechanism which consists of a buy-now price and a menu of deposit
contracts.
Studying the optimal mechanism in the extended monopoly model is substantially more
di¢ cult than that in the baseline monopoly model. This is because when a buyer comes
to the seller for the rst time, she has another dimension of private information which is
whether or not she already has her outside option in hand (and if so, what that outside
option is). This implies that we must solve a multidimensional screening problem. To
mitigate this di¢ culty we consider only deterministic mechanisms.
Before we proceed to the details, consider a hypothetical situation where the seller is
able to tell the buyers who visit it rst from those who already know the outside option.
Then the seller can treat the two groups of buyer separately. The optimal mechanism for
the rst group is the same as in the baseline monopoly model, and it consists of a buy-now
price P and a menu of deposit contracts. With the second group the seller can do not better
than to o¤er a xed price P^ . In general, of course, P 6= P^ and so a simple combination
of these two mechanisms is not implementable when the seller cannot distinguish between
40In general, the outside option can even depend on what the seller itself is o¤ering if the rival is using
a contingent mechanism (i.e., if what the rival is o¤ering depends on the sellers o¤er, e.g., through a
price matching scheme). This possibility is ruled out, as the existing literature on competing mechanism
often did, because studying competing mechanism design which allows for contingent mechanisms is a hard
problem in general. However, the symmetric equilibrium we are considering continues to be an equilibrium
even if we allow for contingent mechanisms. This is because in a (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium, each
seller correctly anticipates the mechanism used by the rival, and so they do not have a strict incentive to
ask buyers to report the mechanism adopted by the rival. Of course, allowing for contingent mechanisms
may generate other equilibria.
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these groups. But this suggests that we should look for the optimal mechanism among
those which consist of a buy-now price and a menu of deposit contracts.
Proof of Proposition 6: Consider rst an extended monopoly model as discussed above.
Suppose  buyers visit the seller rst, as in section 4.2. When such a buyer meets the
seller, she learns her valuation u 2 [0; umax] for the sellers product. But she does not know
the realization of her outside option which is denoted by v 2 [0; vmax]. To reach and learn
the outside option, she has to search and incur a cost s  0. There is a second group of
buyers, with measure , who already know their outside option when they rst visit the
seller. Denote their outside option by v^ 2 [0; v^max]. Let G be the CDF of v as before,
and let G^ be the CDF of v^. (We allow the outside option to di¤er across groups, since
the second group of buyers will only come to the seller if v^ is not too large.) The seller is
unable to distinguish these two groups of buyer. The basic monopoly model in section 4.2
corresponds to the case  = 0.
A sellers best response, given its rival is using the equilibrium mechanism and buyers
hold the equilibrium beliefs, is the optimal mechanism in this extended monopoly model
with  = 1
2
and , G, G^ determined by the equilibrium mechanism. Thus, it su¢ ces to
show that in this extended monopoly model it is without loss of generality to look for the
optimal mechanism among the class of mechanism which consists of a buy-now price and
a menu of deposit contracts.
By the dynamic revelation principle, we can focus on direct mechanisms which induce
truthful report on equilibrium path. A direct mechanism in the extended monopoly model
has two parts:
M = fx(u0); (q0(u0); t0(u0)); (q(u0; v0); t(u0; v0))g
is designed for the  buyers, and
M^ = fq^(u0; v^0); t^(u0; v^0)g
is designed for the  buyers. When a buyer comes to the seller, the seller rst asks whether
she already has her outside option. If she reports yes, sub-mechanism M^ applies. Based on
her report of her valuation u0 for the sellers product and her valuation v^0 for the outside
option, she pays t^(u0; v^0) and gets the sellers product with probability q^(u0; v^0). If she
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reports no, then the sub-mechanism M applies, which is as in the basic monopoly case.
Based on her report of u0, she will be instructed whether to stop searching or not. With
probability x(u0), she will be instructed to stop searching, in which case she pays t0(u0) and
gets the product with probability q0(u0). With probability 1 x(u0), she will be instructed
to look for the outside option, in which case she will be further required to report her
valuation v0 for the outside option. The allocation and the payment scheme will then
depend on both u0 and v0.41
The sellers prot, given that buyers report truthfully, is
Eufx(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)]g+ Eu;v^[t^(u; v^)] :
To ensure truthful reporting, the seller faces the following constraints from each group of
buyers.
The  buyers. Consider a buyer who encounters the seller rst. Let
U(u; u0; v; v0)  maxfu; vgq(u0; v0) + v(1  q(u0; v0))  t(u0; v0)  s
be a type-(u; v) buyers surplus if she choosesM and reports u0 in the rst period and v0
in the second period when she searches for the outside option. Let U(u; v)  U(u; u; v; v)
be the buyers truthful reporting surplus. Let
(u; u0)  x(u0)[uq0(u0)  t0(u0)] + (1  x(u0))Ev[max
v0
U(u; u0; v; v0)]
be a type-u buyers expected surplus if she choosesM and reports u0 in the rst period.
The rst part here is from when the buyer stops searching, and the second part is from
when she continues to search. (Notice that if the buyer lies in the rst period, she usually
has an incentive to lie again in the second period.) Let (u)  (u; u) be this buyers
truthful reporting surplus. Truthful reporting on equilibrium path requires:
(a) A buyer reports truthfully in the second stage if she has reported truthfully in the
rst stage:
U(u; v) = max
v0
: U(u; u; v; v0) (IC-1)
41The natural timing in our model is that once a buyer encounters the seller, she immediately learns
her valuation for the sellers product. So she can mis-report both u and whether she already knows the
outside option simultaneously.
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for all u and v.
(b) She reports truthfully in the rst stage:
(u) = max
u0
: (u; u0) (IC-2)
and
(u)  max
u0;v^0
: uq^(u0; v^0) + (v   s)(1  q^(u0; v^0))  t^(u0; v^0) (34)
for all u. Condition (IC-2) ensures that the buyer reports her valuation for the sellers
product truthfully if she has chosen M. The right-hand side of condition (34) is the
surplus if this buyer instead chooses M^ and reports u0 and v^0. (Here, v is the expected
value of v, taken with respect to the CDFG.) So condition (34) ensures the buyer truthfully
reports that she does not have an outside option yet. As we will see, (34) takes a simpler
form once we have studied the  buyersincentive compatibility conditions. Notice that
(IC-1) and (IC-2) imply that
(u) = x(u)[uq0(u)  t0(u)] + (1  x(u))Ev[U(u; v)] :
Since an  buyer can always continue to search for the outside option after rejecting
the sellers mechanism, the participation constraint is
(u)  v   s (IR)
for all u.
The  buyers. Now consider a buyer who already knows her outside option v^ when she
encounters the seller. If u  v^, the buyer has no incentive to participate in the sellers
mechanism. So without loss of generality, we can specify q^(u; v^) = 0 and t^(u; v^) = 0 for
u  v^, and focus on the buyers with u > v^. Let
^(u; v^)  uq^(u; v^) + v^(1  q^(u; v^))  t^(u; v^)
be a type-(u; v^) buyers surplus if she reports truthfully. (If she gets the sellers product, she
consumes it since u > v^. Otherwise, she consumes the outside option.) Truthful reporting
requires
^(u; v^) = max
u0;v^0
: uq^(u0; v^0) + v^(1  q^(u0; v^0))  t^(u0; v^0) (35)
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and
^(u; v^)  max
u0;v0
: x(u0)[uq0(u0) + v^(1  q0(u0))  t0(u0)] (36)
+(1  x(u0))[uq(u0; v0) + v^(1  q(u0; v0))  t(u0; v0)]
for all u and v^. Condition (35) ensures truthful report of her valuations when the buyer
chooses the correct sub-mechanism M^, while condition (36) ensures that she does not lie
about whether she already has her outside option. (The right-hand side of (36) is the
surplus if a type-(u; v^)  buyer chooses mechanismM and reports u0 in the rst stage and
v0 in the second stage.)
Since a  buyer can always consume the outside option at hand by rejecting the sellers
mechanism, the participation condition is
^(u; v^)  v^ (37)
for all u and v^.
The problem for the  buyers is two dimensional. However, the following observation
helps to simplify (35)-(37).
Claim 1 Condition (35) implies that if u1   v^1 = u2   v^2, then q^(u1; v^1) = q^(u2; v^2) and
t^(u1; v^1) = t^(u2; v^2). Hence, we can focus on M^ = fq^(z); t^(z)g, where z  u   v^ is a 
buyers net valuation for the sellers product.
Proof. There is a one-to-one correspondence between (u; v^) and (z; v^). So we can suppose
the sub-mechanism takes the form M^ = fq^(z; v^); t^(z; v^)g. In this new system, (35) becomes
^(z)  ^(u; v^)  v^ = max
z0;v^0
: zq^(z0; v^0)  t^(z0; v^0) : (38)
The outcome of the maximization problem in the right-hand side depends on z only, which
is why we can dene the left-hand side as a function only of z. Moreover, since the objective
function in (38) is linear in z, ^(z) must be convex in z and so is di¤erentiable almost
everywhere. Consider (z1; v^1) and (z2; v^2) with z1 > z2. Then (38) requires that
^(z1)  ^(z2)  (z1   z2)q^(z2; v^2)
and
^(z2)  ^(z1)  (z2   z1)q^(z1; v^1) :
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Dividing each side by z1   z2 and letting z2 ! z1 yields
q^(z1; v^2)  ^0(z1)  q^(z1; v^1) :
A similar argument for (z1; v^2) and (z2; v^1) generates the opposite inequality. Therefore,
we must have q^(z1; v^2) = q^(z1; v^1), i.e., q^(z; v^) is independent of v^. Since t^(z; v^) = zq^(z; v^) 
^(z), t^(z; v^) is independent of v^ too.
Given this result, we can rewrite the conditions (35)-(37) as:
^(z) = max
z0
: zq^(z0)  t^(z0) ; (IC^-1)
^(z)  max
u0;v0
: x(u0)[zq0(u0)  t0(u0)] + (1  x(u0))[zq(u0; v0)  t(u0; v0)] ; (IC^-2)
and
^(z)  0 : (IR^)
Meanwhile, the incentive compatibility condition (34) for the  buyers becomes
(u)  max
z0
: uq^(z0) + (v   s)(1  q^(z0))  t^(z0) : (IC-3)
In sum, the sellers problem is to maximize
Eufx(u)t0(u) + (1  x(u))Ev[t(u; v)]g+ Ez[t^(z)]
subject to (IC-1), (IC-2), (IC-3), (IR), (IC^-1), (IC^-2) and (IR^). The principal challenge
in this problem stems from the two new incentive compatible conditions (IC^-2) and (IC-3)
which ensure that a buyer truthfully reports whether or not she already knows her outside
option. For these constraints the usual rst-order approach does not work, and as in most
multidimensional screening problems it is ex ante di¢ cult to identify for which u and z
they will bind in the solution.
From now on, we restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms, i.e., mechanisms with
q^; x; q0; q 2 f0; 1g. We rst analyze the mechanism M^ for the  buyers. The next result
says that M^ is incentive compatible and individually rational only if it takes the form of
a xed price.
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Claim 2 Constraints (IC^-1) and (IR^) imply that there exists a threshold k  0 such
that
q^(z) =

1 if z > k
0 otherwise
(39)
and
t^(z) =

k if z > k
0 otherwise.
(40)
Proof. By a standard argument, (IC^-1) implies q^(z) weakly increases with z. Since
q^(z) 2 f0; 1g, (39) follows immediately. If the seller does not allocate its product, it cannot
ask the buyer to make a positive payment because of the participation constraint (IR^). If
the seller allocates its product to two buyers z1 and z2, it cannot ask for di¤erent payments
(otherwise, one buyer would mis-report). So t^(z) must be a constant for z > k. It remains
to show t^(z) = k for z > k. If t^(z) > k, then buyers with z slightly above k would rather
give up the product. If t^(z) < k, then buyers with z slightly below k would mis-report
z0 > k in order to get the product and obtain a positive surplus. Therefore, a deterministic
mechanism M^ which satises (IC^-1) and (IR^) must satisfy (39) and (40).
Turn next to the mechanismM aimed at the  buyers. We rst explore the implications
of the constraints for x(u), q0(u) and t0(u). The following result says that in an incentive
compatible and individually rational mechanismM, any  buyer with u greater than some
threshold will be instructed to stop searching and get the product immediately at a xed
price, and those with u below the threshold will be instructed to search for the outside
option.
Claim 3 The constraints (IC-1), (IC-2) and (IR) imply there exists a threshold u^ and
constant t0  u^  (v   s) such that
x(u) =

1 if u > u^
0 otherwise
(41)
q0(u) =

1 if u > u^
0 otherwise
(42)
and
t0(u) =

t0 if u > u^
0 otherwise.
(43)
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Proof. The key step is to show (41). Since we are considering deterministic mechanisms
with x(u) 2 f0; 1g, it su¢ ces to show that x(u) is weakly increasing. We initially make
two observations. First, notice that both U(u; u0; v; v0) and (u; u0) are convex in u. So
(IC-1) and (IC-2) together imply that (u) is convex, and by an envelope argument we
have
0(u) = x(u)q0(u) + (1  x(u))
Z u
0
q(u; v)dG(v) : (44)
The convexity of (u) requires that 0(u) weakly increases in u. Second, notice that
q0(u) = 1 if x(u) = 1. (If an  buyer anticipates that she will be asked to stop searching
but will not get the product when she reports truthfully, she will either not participate
into the mechanism or mis-report her type.)
Now consider u2 < u1, and suppose x(u2) = 1 and x(u1) = 0 in contrast to the claim.
Then we have q0(u2) = 1 from the second observation above, and so (44) implies 0(u2) = 1.
Since 0(u) must be weakly increasing, we have
0(u1) =
Z u1
0
q(u1; v)dG(v) = 1 : (45)
But this is impossible as we show below.
If u1 < vmax, it is clear that (45) cannot hold. Now consider u1  vmax, in which case
(45) requires q(u1; v) = 1 for all possible v. Given the requirement of truthful reporting in
the second stage, this implies that t(u1; v) should be independent of v. Let t1 = t(u1; v).
Then (u1) = u1   t1   s. If this buyer reports u2, her surplus will be u1   t0(u2). So
truthful reporting requires
t1 + s  t0(u2) :
Meanwhile, the equilibrium surplus of the buyer with u2 is (u2) = u2   t0(u2). If she
deviates and reports u1, her expected surplus will be Ev[maxfu2; vg]  t1   s. So truthful
reporting requires
t1 + s  t0(u2) + Ev[maxfu2; vg]  u2 > t0(u2) :
This leads to a contradiction, and so completes the proof for (41).
The other two results (42) and (43) just follow from (41) and the second observation
above. (Notice that for u  u^, it does not matter how to specify q0(u) and t0(u) since the
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buyer will be asked to search anyway.) Finally, the restriction t0  u^   (v   s) follows
because of condition (IR) for u > u^.
We further explore the implications of the constraints for the second-stage mechanism
fq(u; v); t(u; v)g.
Claim 4 Constraint (IC-1) implies there exist functions (u)  u and t(u) such that
q(u; v) =

1 if v  (u)
0 otherwise
(46)
and
t(u; v) =

t(u) + u  (u) if v  (u)
t(u) otherwise.
(47)
This claim says that in an incentive compatible mechanism M, if a type-u buyer
searches for the outside option, she will be given the product if and only if her outside
option is below a threshold (u). She pays at least t(u) in either case, but when she gets
the product she pays an extra amount u  (u). This corresponds to a situation where the
buyer pays a non-refundable deposit t(u) in order to search, and an extra payment u (u)
if she returns to buy later.
Proof. Condition (IC-1) implies that U(u; v) is convex in v since the objective function
U(u; u; v; v0) itself is convex in v. By an envelope argument we have
@
@v
U(u; v) =

1  q(u; v) if v  u
1 otherwise.
The convexity of U(u; v) in v requires that q(u; v) be weakly decreasing in v when v  u.
Since q(u; v) 2 f0; 1g in a deterministic mechanism, it follows that there exists (u)  u
such that
q(u; v) =

1 if v  (u)
0 if (u) < v  u :
To ensure truthful reporting, the payment scheme must take the form
t(u; v) =

t(u) + u  (u) if v  (u)
t(u) if (u) < v  u :
It is easy to understand that in each interval the payment must be independent of v
(otherwise some buyers would mis-report v given the same allocation outcome). The
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di¤erence u   (u) between the two payments is because the buyer with v = (u) should
be indi¤erent about whether she gets the sellers product or not.
For a buyer with v > u, she will consume v regardless of whether she gets the sellers
product or not. Hence, for this buyer to report her v truthfully, t(u; v)must be independent
of v for v > u, and denote it by ~t(u). If this buyer mis-reports v0 2 ((u); u], her surplus
will be v   t(u). So truthful reporting requires ~t(u)  t(u). Similarly, for a buyer with
v 2 ((u); u] not to mis-report v0 > u, we need t(u)  ~t(u) (independent of the value of
q(u; v0)). Therefore, ~t(u) = t(u). In the same time, if q(u; v) = 1 for v > u, then those
buyers with v  (u) will have an incentive to mis-report v0 > u in order to get the product
at a lower price. Thus, we need q(u; v) = 0 for v > u.
So far we have not used the constraints (IC-3) and (IC^-2) which ensure that the buyers
will truthfully report about whether they already have their outside option.
Claim 5 When u^ < umax (where u^ is introduced in Claim 3), constraints (IC-3) and
(IC^-2) imply that
k = t0 ; (48)
where k and t0 are dened in (39) and (43) respectively.
Proof. When u^ < umax, (41), (42) and (43) imply that (u) = u   t0 for u > u^. Then
(IC-3) requires
u  t0  u  k :
In the same time, for z > k, (39) and (40) imply ^(z) = z   k. Then (IC^-2) requires
z   k  z   t0 :
These two inequalities imply k = t0.
In sum, we have shown that any incentive compatible and individually rational (de-
terministic) mechanism fM;M^g must satisfy all the conditions stated in Claims 25.42
However, any mechanism which satises these conditions can be replicated by a mechanism
which consists of a buy-now price P and a menu of deposit contracts fD(u); p(u)g. For a
42These conditions are not su¢ cient for incentive compatibility and individual rationality. For su¢ ciency,
further conditions need to be imposed on k, u^, t0, (u) and t(u).
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mechanism with u^ < umax, we can use the following indirect mechanism with a buy-now
price
P = k = t0
and a menu of deposit contracts
fD(u) = t(u); p(u) = u  (u)g for u  u^ :
It is not di¢ cult to see that this mechanism leads to the same choice outcome as the
original direct mechanism. (The only non-trivial part is when a type-u buyer picks a
deposit contract (D(u0); p(u0)) and chooses to search. Suppose she nds out that her
valuation for the outside option is v. Then if she returns to buy the sellers product, her
surplus will be maxfu; vg   (t(u0) + u0   (u0))   s. If she chooses not to buy the sellers
product, her surplus will be v   t(u0)  s. In the direct mechanism if the buyer reports u0
in the rst stage, she will face exactly the same two options, depending on whether she
reports v0  (u0) or not in the second stage.) For a mechanism with u^ = umax, then q0
and t0 do not matter, and we can use the same indirect mechanism with P = k.
We conclude that in the extended monopoly model, it is without loss of generality
to look for the optimal (deterministic) mechanism among the class of mechanism which
consists of a buy-now price and a menu of deposit contracts. This completes the proof.
Equilibrium analysis for general mechanisms.
Extended monopoly. To study the equilibrium mechanism in the duopoly model, we rst
study the optimal mechanism in the extended monopoly model as discussed in the proof
of Proposition 6. We know that if we focus on deterministic mechanisms, it is without loss
of generality to consider mechanisms which consist of a buy-now price P and a menu of
deposit contracts fD(p); pg, where if a buyer pays a deposit D(p), she has the right to buy
the product later at an incremental price p.
Suppose that for all buy-later prices p we have P  D(p) + p (which will be veried
later). Then the  buyers who already know their outside option will buy at the buy-now
price P if and only if u  v^ > P . So the prot from each  buyer is (P )  P (1 H(P )),
where H is the CDF of net surplus u  v^.
61
Now consider the  buyers who visit the seller rst. If a type-u buyer chooses a deposit
contract (D(p); p) and continues to search, her expected surplus is
Ev[maxfv; u  pg] D(p)  s = R(u  p) D(p) + v   s ;
where
R(x)  Ev[maxfv; xg   v] = S(x) + x  v =
Z x
0
G(v)dv
is the ex ante benet to the buyer of being able to return to obtain surplus x from the
seller once she has discovered her outside option v. Clearly, R(x) = 0 if x  0, and R is
convex and increasing.
If the buyer decides to choose one of the deposit contracts, she will choose the best
contract from the menu, with resulting surplus
(u)  max
p
: fR(u  p) D(p) + v   sg :
Since the function R() is increasing and convex, () is also increasing and convex and
hence di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Let p(u) be the optimal choice of buy-later price for
the type-u buyer (which is uniquely determined almost everywhere). Since R() is convex,
a revealed preference argument shows p(u) must weakly decrease with u. The envelope
theorem implies that
0(u) = R0(u  p(u)) = G(u  p(u)) ; (49)
and the deposit payment associated with the buy-later price p(u) is
D(u) = R(u  p(u)) + v   s  (u) : (50)
Expression (49) implies that the surplus from choosing a deposit contract increases with
u but with slope less than 1. By contrast, the surplus from leaving the rm altogether,
v   s, does not depend on u, and the surplus from immediate purchase, u   P , increases
with slope 1. Thus, for small u, say for u < u, the buyer leaves the seller immediately,
for intermediate u, say u  u  u^, the buyer chooses one of the deposit contracts, and
for u > u^ the buyer buys immediately without search.43 For the buyer to be indi¤erent
43By choosing u and u^ appropriately one can allow only a subset of the three strategies to be made
available. For instance, setting u = u^ means that no option to buy later is made available and the seller
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between the relevant options at the points u and u^, we require
(u) = v   s ; (u^) = u^  P : (51)
Using this and (49), we have
(u) = v   s+
Z u
u
G(~u  p(~u))d~u : (52)
If the type-u buyer chooses a deposit contract with buy-later price p, she will return to
buy later when v  u  p, i.e., with probability G(u  p).
The sellers prot is then


P (1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
u
fD(u) + p(u)G(u  p(u))g dF (u)

+ (P ) ; (53)
where D(u) is given in (50). The rst portion is the prot from the  buyers, and the
second portion is the prot from the  buyers. Integrating by parts and using (49) yieldsZ u^
u
(u)dF (u) = (u)(1  F (u))  (u^)(1  F (u^)) +
Z u^
u
G(u  p(u))(1  F (u))du :
Using this and (51), we can rewrite the term [] in (53) as
(u^ (v s))(1 F (u^))+
Z u^
u

R(u  p(u)) +G(u  p(u))

p(u)  1  F (u)
f(u)

dF (u) (54)
which is a function of (u; u^; p(u)). Using (52), we have
P = u^  (u^) = u^  (v   s) 
Z u^
u
G(u  p(u))du : (55)
So (P ) in (53) is also a function of (u; u^; p(u)).
We rst ignore the constraint that p(u) should be weakly decreasing and derive the
optimal p(u) given u and u^. Substituting (54) and (55) into (53) and maximizing the
prot with respect to p(u), we can check that the candidate p(u) satises44
p(u) =
1  F (u)
f(u)
+
1
f(u)


0(u^  (v   s) 
Z u^
u
G(~u  p(~u))d~u) : (56)
makes an exploding o¤er, while if u^ = umax no consumer buys without search. In the baseline monopoly
model with  = 0, given the assumption a < umax, we must have u^ < umax and u > 0. While in the
extended monopoly model we may have a corner solution with u^ = umax. This case can be treated by a
modied analysis. However, as we will see later, this does occur in the duopoly case with two symmetric
sellers.
44This can be done by the standard technique of calculus of variations. It can also be checked that given
u < u^, (56) is also su¢ cient for p(u) to be the solution if () is concave.
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(When  = 0, the solution is consistent with the buy-later price in Proposition 3.) To deal
with this functional equation, let K = 

0() in (56). Then
p(u) =
1  F (u) +K
f(u)
; (57)
where K solves the equation
K =


0(P ) (58)
with
P = u^  (v   s) 
Z u^
u
G(u  1  F (u) +K
f(u)
)du : (59)
Substituting (57) into the prot function and maximizing it with respect to u and u^
yields
u  p(u) = 0 (60)
and
u^  p(u^) = a ; (61)
where a solves S(a) = s as in the baseline monopoly model. (When u  p(u) is increasing,
the prot function is single-peaked in u and u^.)
If p(u) in (57) is decreasing, the optimal mechanism is characterized by (57)-(61). It
can also be shown that this system has a unique solution if in addition () is concave.45
Unlike in the baseline monopoly model, here the logconcavity condition (3) is not enough
for p(u) in (57) to be decreasing. Due to the endogeneity of the constant K (which might
be positive or negative), it is hard to derive a primitive condition for this to hold. But p(u)
is indeed decreasing at least in the uniform distribution example where p(u) = 1  u+K.
When p(u) is decreasing, one can check that the  buyers will indeed choose the correct
deposit contract. Our analysis is also predicated on P  D(u) + p(u) for u 2 [u; u^] such
that  buyers have no incentive to choose a deposit contract. Using (50), we have
D(u) + p(u) = p(u) +R(u  p(u))  (u) + v   s :
45If p(u) is decreasing, then u   p(u) is increasing, and (60) and (61) uniquely determine u and u^ as
functions of K. We also have u < u^ and both of them increase in K. Using the second observation, one
can verify that P in (59) increases in K. Then the right-hand side of (58) decreases in K if  is concave.
This ensures that (58) has a unique solution.
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Using (51) and (61), one can verify thatD(u^)+p(u^) = P . On the other hand, the derivative
of D(u) + p(u) with respect to u is
p0(u)(1 G(u  p(u))) :
Hence, if p(u) is decreasing, D(u) + p(u) decreases in u and so P  D(u) + p(u) for
u 2 [u; u^]. In the same time, as in the baseline monopoly model we also have D(u) = 0
and p(u) = u (which can be veried by using (50), (51) and (60)), and so a buyer always
has the option to return to buy at price u without paying a deposit.
Duopoly. We now solve the equilibrium mechanism in the duopoly model. The extra
complication in the duopoly case is that the outside options v and v^ are endogenous and
depend on the equilibrium selling mechanism. Let
(P; fD(u); p(u)gu2[u;u^])
be the symmetric equilibrium mechanism. Given seller j is using the equilibrium mecha-
nism and buyers hold equilibrium beliefs, seller is problem is the same as the extended
monopoly model with the following specications:
(i) Half the buyers visit seller i rst (so  = 1
2
). If a buyer decides to visit seller j without
paying a deposit, she will either buy seller js product at price P (given P  D(u) + p(u))
or leave the market with nothing. So this buyers outside option is v = maxf0; uj   Pg,
and its CDF is
G(v) = F (v + P ) (62)
for v 2 [0; umax   P ]. (Notice that v has a mass point at zero, but this does not a¤ect our
analysis in the extended monopoly model.) The mean of v is then
v =
Z umax
P
[1  F (v)]dv : (63)
The reservation surplus a solves
s =
Z umax
a+P
[1  F (v)]dv ;
so
a = A  P ; (64)
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where A is dened in (13) and is the threshold of match utility for immediate purchase
in the free-recall benchmark. (Both v and a decrease in P because a higher P makes the
outside option v less attractive.)
(ii) The other half of the buyers visit seller j rst, and F (u^) fraction of them will
continue on to visit seller i (so  = 1
2
F (u^)). For those who value seller js product at
uj 2 [u; u^], they pay a deposit D(uj) to seller j and then visit seller i, and so act as if they
have an outside option v^ = uj   p(uj). Those who value seller js product below u also
visit seller i but without paying a deposit to seller j, so they have outside option v^ = 0.
Then the CDF of the net valuation z = ui   v^, conditional on a buyer coming to seller i
after visiting seller j, is
H(z) = Pr(ui   v^  zjuj  u^)
=
1
F (u^)

F (z)F (u) +
Z u^
u
F (z + uj   p(uj))dF (uj)

: (65)
(In equilibrium, we have u^ p(u^) = a and u p(u) = 0, and so the support of z is [ a; umax].)
If seller i sets buy-now price ~P , its prot from each  buyer is ( ~P )  ~P (1 H( ~P )). The
derivative of this function , evaluated at ~P = P for convenience later, can be shown to
be
0(P ) =
1
F (u^)

(P )F (u) +
Z u^
u
(P + u  p(u))dF (u)

; (66)
where
(x)  1  F (x)  xf(x) :
Notice that ( ~P ) is concave if (x) is decreasing, i.e., if x(1  F (x)) is concave, as is now
assumed in the following discussion.
Seller is best response to js equilibrium selling mechanism can then be calculated as
in the extended monopoly model with  = 1
2
,  = 1
2
F (u^), G as dened in (62), and H as
dened in (65). Therefore, the buy-later price is
p(u) =
1  F (u) +K
f(u)
(67)
for u 2 [u; u^], where u and u^ are determined by
u  p(u) = 0 ; (68)
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and
u^  p(u^) = A  P ; (69)
respectively. The remaining two parameters K and P solve
K = (P )F (u) +
Z u^
u
(P + u  p(u))dF (u) ; (70)
and
P = u^  (v   s) 
Z u^
u
F (P + u  p(u))du : (71)
(Equation (70) is from (58), 

= F (u^), and (66). Equation (71) is from (59) and G()
dened in (62).) In addition, notice that v depends on P as indicated in (63).
The symmetric equilibrium mechanism is characterized by the system of (67)(71) if it
has a solution such that p(u) is decreasing. Suppose this is true. Then following a similar
argument as in the monopoly case, we have P  D(u) + p(u) for u 2 [u; u^]. In particular,
the equality holds at u = u^. Then from (69) we have u^ = A  D(u^) < A. That is, more
buyers buy immediately at the rst visited seller than in the free-recall case. Meanwhile,
as in the monopoly model we have D(u) = 0 and p(u) = u, so u is also the buy-later price
when a buyer does not pay a deposit.
However, as in the extended monopoly model, it is hard to nd a general condition
under which the system of (67)(71) has a solution with p(u) decreasing. However, this is
the case with the uniform example with F (u) = u. In that case, we have p(u) = 1 u+K
(which is decreasing), A = 1 p2s, and v = 1
2
(1  P )2. To have active search, the search
cost s should not exceed 1
8
. The four parameters (u; u^; P;K) then solve the following system
of simultaneous equations:
u = 1
2
(1 +K)
u^ = 1
2
(2 
p
2s  P +K)
K = u^(1  2P )  2
Z u^
u
(2u  1 K)du
P = u^  1
2
(1  P )2 + s 
Z u^
u
(P + 2u  1 K)du :
Substituting the rst two equations into the latter two, one can derive that
K =
1
1 + 2P
(P 2   3P + 1 +
p
2s  2s)
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and
2P 3 + 3P 2 + (6  4s)P + 2s  2
p
2s  3 = 0 :
The second equation has a unique real solution P for s 2 [0; 1
8
], which is depicted on Figure
5a, and so the system of four equations has a unique solution. Numerical simulations
indicate that 0 < u < u^ < 1 for s < 1
8
, and the following table reports some parameters of
interest for a range of search costs s:
s = 0 0:05 0:1 0:125
u 0:489 0:511 0:505 0:5
u^ 0:790 0:621 0:536 0:5
P 0:399 0:464 0:489 0:5
K  0:021 0:021 0:009 0
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